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REASSESSING THE PURPOSES OF
FEDERAL QUESTION JURISDICTION
John F. Preis*

For ages, judges and legal academics have claimed that
federal question jurisdiction has three purposes: to provide
litigants with a judge experienced in federal law, to protect
litigants from state court hostility toward federal claims, and to
preserve uniformity in federal law. Because federal claims, for
the most part, have always been cognizable in state courts,
these purposes imply that state courts are less experienced,
more hostile, and more likely to adjudicate federal law in ways
that decrease the uniformity of federal law. Despite the ongoing
allegiance to this conception of federal question jurisdictionand by implication, state court adjudication of federal
questions--0ne would be hard-pressed to find much research
assessing the performance of state courts in these areas.
This Article explores these issues by relying on a fifteen-state
study of state civil opinions resolving federal questions. The
study reveals several reasons to doubt the claim that state court
adjudication of federal law will automatically decrease the
uniformity of federal law. In contrast, the study suggests that
federal courts are indeed more experienced in federal law,
though their comparative experience is not uniform across all
areas of federal law. With regard to the presumed hostility of
state courts toward federal claims, this Article joins other
scholars in questioning whether such a thesis may ever be
reliably employed in the federal courts field.
After addressing the three presumed purposes of federal
question jurisdiction, the Article identifies an additional
purpose that is rarely acknowledged in scholarship on the
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Rich, and Michael Solimine. In addition, Paul Hendrix, Andrew Parmenter,
and David Schreiber provided valuable research assistance throughout the
project.
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subject. That is, federal question jurisdiction promotes the
federal government's sovereignty interests by allowing it to
control the content of federal law. Without federal question
jurisdiction, the federal government would only be able to
control the interpretation of federal law through Supreme
Court review of state decisions, which is quite limited in
practice.
After defining the role of federal question jurisdiction as one
of experience and control, the Article concludes by briefiy
discussing the impact of these findings on the jurisdictional
questions faced by courts and Congress.
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INTRODUCTION

The Supreme Court believes that federal question jurisdiction
has three purposes: (1) to provide litigants with judges more
"experience[d]" in federal law than state judges, (2) to provide
litigants with judges more "solicit[ous]" of federal claims than state
judges, and (3) to promote the "uniformO" interpretation of federal
1
law which would suffer if interpreted chiefly in the state courts.
1. Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng'g & Mfg. Co., 545 U.S.
308, 312 (2005). The precise issue in the case was whether a state law quiettitle action, the resolution of which hinged on the meaning of federal tax law,
could be heard in federal court under federal question jurisdiction (28 U.S.C. §
1331). The Court unanimously held that the case did "arise under" federal law
for the purposes of federal question jurisdiction. Eight justices joined in a
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2

Just about everybody else seems to believe this, too. There is a
problem with this, however: we know very little about state court
behavior in adjudicating federal questions.
This Article aims to provide a better understanding of how state
courts decide federal questions and, in doing so, suggests that the
presumed purposes of federal question jurisdiction may be
overstated or even unjustified altogether. With regard to the claim
that federal question jurisdiction promotes uniformity, the Article,
in Part III, points to many factors that suggest that state court
adjudication of federal questions may have little effect on the
uniformity of federal law. In Part IV, relying on a study of state
civil opinions published in fifteen different states, the Article
concludes that state courts do in fact have significant experience in
certain areas of federal law, though their experience with federal
statutes is particularly weak compared to the federal judiciary.
Turning in Part V to the claim that federal courts are more
solicitous of federal claims than state courts, the Article joins other
scholars in arguing that the current research in this area is
insufficient to support a uniform presumption that federal courts
will, on average, exceed state courts in their solicitude for federal
claims. After addressing these three presumed purposes, the Article
introduces in Part VI a typically unrecognized purpose of federal
question jurisdiction: the promotion of the federal government's
sovereignty interests. Providing the federal courts jurisdiction to
hear roughly 160,000 federal claims each year, the federal question
statute is a major way that the federal government can control the
content of federal law. 3 Although the federal courts thus hear large
majority opinion that looked to the three presumed purposes of federal question
jurisdiction to resolve the issue. Justice Thomas authored a short, two-page
concurring opinion in which he argued that, although the majority reached the
proper conclusion, it should have relied on a bright-line rule rather than a
balancing test. Thomas did not voice, however, any disagreement with the
majority's enunciation of the principles of experience, uniformity, and
solicitude. See id. at 320 (Thomas, J., concurring).
2. See infra notes 9-25 and accompanying text.
3. While scholars and judges often speak of sovereignty in discussing
federal courts' role, Erwin Chemerinsky & Larry Kramer, Defining the Role of
the Federal Courts, 1990 BYU L. REV. 67, 80-81; Barry Friedman, Under the
Law of Federal Jurisdiction: Allocating Cases Between Federal and State
Courts, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1211, 1226 (2004), sovereignty is rarely given a role
in federal question jurisdiction in particular. Tellingly, the American Law
Institute's landmark study of federal jurisdiction-which was authored by some
of the most eminent scholars in the field-adopted the three-part description
noted supra and did not address any sovereignty concerns. AMERICAN LAW
INSTITUTE, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL
COURTS 164-65 (1969).
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numbers of claims under the federal question statute, the Article
makes clear in Part VII that the jurisdictional grant does not likely
shield states from a significant caseload burden. State courts could
likely absorb federal question cases without suffering significant
institutional problems. After elucidating the purposes of federal
question jurisdiction, the Article briefly considers in Part VIII the
doctrinal import of the purposes in certain areas of federal
jurisdiction. Part IX then ends the Article with a short conclusion.
II.

THE PREVAILING BELIEFS

Article III, section 2 of the United States Constitution places
within the "judicial power" of the federal courts "all Cases, in Law
and Equity, arising under th[e] Constitution, the Laws of the United
States, and Treaties made ... under their Authority.',4 This grant of
judicial power is largely implemented by 28 U.S.C. § 1331, which
employs language nearly identical to that used in Article III. 5 The
primary impact of this statute is to make federal courts available to
adjudicate federal questions. This Part explains the three purposes
scholars and jurists attribute to such jurisdiction: the preservation
of uniformity in federal law, the provision of a forum hospitable to
federal law, and the provision of a judge likely to have experience in
federal law. 6
Before discussing the prevailing beliefs, however, it is important
to note that § 1331 is just one way that federal courts obtain
jurisdiction over federal claims. A number of federal statutes
contain their own jurisdictional provisions such that, even if§ 1331
were removed from the U.S. Code, these claims could still be
Moreover, even when scholars discuss sovereignty interests in the context
of the federal courts, they typically fail to distinguish between the different
types of sovereignty interests-which include controlling sovereign law and
having the right to litigate in sovereign courts. This Article recognizes that the
distinction is important and should be accounted for in federal question
doctrine.
4. U.S. CONST. art. 3, § 2.
5. Section 1331 provides that "[t]he district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties
of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2000).
6. For clarity's sake, I present the three purposes separately. This risks
implying that some courts and scholars subscribe to some of the three purposes
but not all of them as a package. This is not the case. The three-part
conception of federal jurisdiction is dominant in the judiciary and the academy.
This is perhaps best exemplified by the Supreme Court's most recent
pronouncement in Grable, 545 U.S. at 312, as well as the American Law
Institute's statement-written by the top scholars in the field at that pointthat the jurisdictional grant serves these three goals. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE,
supra note 3, at 164-65.
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brought in federal court. 7 While the current scope of federal
question jurisdiction is thus a product of § 1331, as well as
numerous particular jurisdictional grants, it is still possible to speak
of federal question jurisdiction as a coherent whole. The arguments
advanced in favor of federal question jurisdiction do not hinge on
whether the grant is accomplished on a statute-by-statute basis or
globally with a single statute. Indeed, two of the three beliefs about
the need for federal question jurisdiction predate the creation of
general federal question jurisdiction by almost a century. 8 Thus,
while this Article often refers to"§ 1331" as a figurehead of federal
question jurisdiction, one should note that the true federal question
jurisdiction is accomplished by § 1331 and many jurisdictional
provisions in other pieces of legislation.

A.

Uniformity
In Federalist No. 80, Alexander Hamilton explained why federal
courts must be available to adjudicate federal law. "The mere
necessity of uniformity in the interpretation of the national laws,"
he explained, "decides the question. Thirteen independent courts of
final jurisdiction over the same causes, arising upon the same laws,
is a hydra in government, from which nothing but contradiction and
confusion can proceed."9
In the centuries since Hamilton voiced this view, countless
10
11
jurists and scholars have concurred. Moreover, the notion retains

7. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2000) (permitting civil claimants to sue in
federal court); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (2000) (permitting federal courts to
adjudicate civil actions "brought under" Title VII).
8. These are the uniformity and solicitude beliefs. See infra notes 9-12 &
18-25 and accompanying text.
9. THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 535 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke
ed., 1961).
10. Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 293 (1997) (stating
that federal interpretation of federal law is a "means of serving a federal
interest in uniformity"); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367,
383 (1996) (explaining that, in the context of exclusive federal jurisdiction over
federal securities actions, the only extant purpose is "to achieve greater
uniformity of construction and more effective and expert application of that
law"); Reed v. Farley, 512 U.S. 339, 348-49 (1994) (explaining that federal
jurisdiction is important to creating a "nationally uniform interpretation");
Taffiin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 464 (1990) (noting in the context of exclusive
federal jurisdiction that interpretation of federal law by a limited number of
courts promotes the "desirability of uniform interpretation"); Chick Kam Choo
v. Exxon Corp., 486 U.S. 140, 151 (1988) (White, J., concurring) (stating that
the "federal interest in uniformity" may require the case be heard in federal
court); Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 826 (1986)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (explaining that one of the "reasons Congress found it
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necessary to add [federal question) jurisdiction to the district courts" is "the
importance, and even necessity of uniformity of decisions throughout the whole
United States, upon all subjects within the purview of the constitution")
(quoting Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 347-48 (1816))
(emphasis in original); Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 256
(1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (stating that an "essential function of the
federal courts" is to "provide a fair and impartial forum for the uniform
interpretation and enforcement of the supreme law of the land"); Gulf Offshore
Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 483-84 (1981) (stating in the context of
exclusive federal jurisdiction that "desirability of uniform interpretation" is an
interest advanced by the jurisdictional grant); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.
475, 514 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (stating that the grant of federal
jurisdiction was "designed" to "achieve greater uniformity of results") (citing
Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 347-48 (1816)); Brown v.
Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 541 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring) (noting in the habeas
jurisdiction context that, because the "uniformity of federal law [is] attainable
only by a centralized source of authority, denial by a state of a claimed federal
right must give some access to the federal judicial system").
11. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 3, at 165-66 ("There is reason to
believe ... that greater uniformity results from hearing [federal question) cases
in a federal court."); ERWIN CHEMERINKSY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION§ 5.2.1, at 265
(2d ed. 1994) ("Another frequently offered justification for federal question
jurisdiction is the need to ensure uniformity in the interpretation of federal
law."); MARTIN H. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION
OF JUDICIAL POWER 101 (2d ed. 1990) (noting that "precedential confusion [will
be) caused by the dramatic increase in the number of interpreting courts");
Patti Alleva, Prerogative Lost: The Trouble with Federal Question Jurisdiction
After Merrell Dow, 52 Omo ST. L.J. 1477, 1496 (1991) (noting that federal
question jurisdiction provides the "the potential for uniform interpretation of
federal law"); Chemerinsky & Kramer, supra note 3, at 83-85 (asserting that
federal jurisdiction of some sort is necessary to assure the "uniform
interpretation and application of federal law"); Christopher A. Cotropia,
Counterclaims, the Well-Pleaded Complaint, and Federal Jurisdiction, 33
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 39 (2004) (stating that one of "the purposes behind federal
question jurisdiction" is the "goal of uniformity"); Donald L. Doernberg, There's
No Reason For It; It's Just Our Policy: Why the Well-Pleaded Complaint Rule
Sabotages the Purposes of Federal Question Jurisdiction, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 597,
647 (1987) (finding that federal question jurisdiction exists in part out of "the
need for uniformity in [the] interpretation and application [of federal law]");
Friedman, supra note 3, at 1241 (stating that state court adjudication offederal
law will create "disuniformity," which is a "serious problemO"); Jeffrey W.
Grove, Supreme Court Monitoring of State Courts in the Twenty-First Century:
A Response to Professor Solimine, 35 IND. L. REV. 365, 366 (2002) ("In my
judgment, uniformity-or at least an increased potential for uniformity of
federal law-is a value of the first rank."); Thomas B. Marvell, The Rationales
for Federal Court Jurisdiction: An Empirical Examination of Student Rights
Litigation, 1984 Wis. L. REV. 1315, 1335 (1984) (noting uniformity as one of four
rationales for federal question jurisdiction); Paul J. Mishkin, The Federal
"Question" in the District Courts, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 157, 158 (1953) (explaining
that the existence of the federal courts' is important to "achieving widespread,
uniform effectuation of federal law" given that the Supreme Court actually
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its currency today. As noted in the Introduction, the Supreme Court
in 2005 continued this tradition by stating that § 1331 jurisdiction
provides a ''hope of uniformity" in the interpretation of federal law .12

B.

Experience

While the uniformity rationale originated early on in the
republic, the notion that federal question jurisdiction provides
litigants with judges experienced in federal law is much newer.
Nonetheless, it is just as strongly established as other putative
purposes of the jurisdictional grant. In describing the role federal
question jurisdiction plays in the national judicial order, the
American Law Institute explained in its Study of the Division of
Jurisdiction Between State and Federal Courts that "[t]he federal
courts have acquired a considerable expertness in the interpretation
and application of federal law." 13 State courts, by contrast, have
much less expertise because "federal question cases must form a
very small part of the business of [state] courts." 14 "As a result, the
federal courts are comparatively more skilled at interpreting and
applying federal law, and are much more likely correctly to divine
Congress's intent in enacting legislation." 15 One need not look hard
to find numerous courts 16 and scholars 17 who subscribe to this view.
decides relatively few cases); Robert A. Schapiro, Toward a Theory Of
Interactive Federalism, 91 IOWA L. REV. 243, 290 (2005); Eric J. Segall, Article
III As A Grant Of Power: Protective Jurisdiction, Federalism and the Federal
Courts, 54 FLA. L. REV. 361, 392 (2002) (stating that "federal jurisdiction was
always intended to be instrumental" and that one of its goals is to "promote the
uniformity and supremacy of federal law").
12. Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng'g & Mfg. Co., 545 U.S.
308, 312 (2005).
13. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 3, at 164-65.
14. Id. at 165.
15. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 827 (1986)
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
16. U.S. v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439, 464 n.11 (1988) (noting that, because the
Federal Circuit focuses only on a single subject matter, it "brings to the cases
before it an unusual expertise"); Merrell Dow Pharms., 478 U.S. at 826 (stating
that § 1331 provides litigants with a "forum that specializes in federal law and
that is therefore more likely to apply that law correctly"); Gulf Offshore Co. v.
Mobil Oil Co., 453 U.S. 473, 484 (1981) (noting the "expertise of federal judges
in federal law"); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 514 (1973) (explaining that
Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1331 "to preserve and enhance the expertise of
federal courts in applying federal law"); Medema v. Medema Builders, Inc., 854
F.2d 210, 213 (7th Cir. 1988) (noting that exclusive federal jurisdiction
"cultivate[s] [federal] uniformity and expertise"); Winningham v. U. S. Dep't of
Haus. & Urban Dev., 512 F.2d 617, 621 (5th Cir. 1975) ("Federal jurisdiction
over actions arising under acts of Congress governing the conduct of federal
officials [should be decided by federal] tribunals which have acquired experience
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Solicitude

Like the belief in uniformity, the belief that federal courts are
more solicitous of federal claims than state courts (or conversely
that state courts are more hostile to federal claims than federal
18
courts) can be traced back to Alexander Hamilton. Speaking on the
issue, Hamilton explained:
What, for instance, would avail restrictions on the authority of
the state legislatures, without some constitutional mode of
enforcing the observance of them? The states, by the plan of
the convention, are prohibited from doing a variety of things;
some of which are incompatible with the interests of the union,
and others with the principles of good government. The
imposition of duties on imported articles, and the emission of
paper money, are specimens of each kind. No man of sense will
believe, that such prohibitions would be scrupulously
and expertise in dealing with national legislation."); see also S. REP. No. 1507
(1966) ("Additionally, the Federal courts have more expertise in deciding
questions involving treaties with the Federal Government, as well as
interpreting the relevant body of Federal law that has developed over the
years.").
17. As Professor Redish has put it:
[F]ederal courts have developed a vast expertise in dealing with the
intricacies of federal law, while the state judiciary has, quite
naturally, devoted the bulk of its efforts to the evolution and
refinement of state law and policy. It would be unreasonable to expect
state judiciaries to possess a facility equal to that of the federal courts
in adjudicating federal law.
REDISH, supra note 11, at 2; see also Alleva, supra note 11, at 1495 (stating that
§ 1331 takes advantage of federal courts' "expertise in discerning and
interpreting federal interests"); Guido Calabresi, Federal and State Courts:
Restoring A Workable Balance, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1293, 1304 (2003) ("We are
federal judges, we have more knowledge of federal law. You are state judges,
you have more knowledge of state law. Let each of us do our job and not be
insulted."); Friedman, supra note 3, 1236-37; Alan D. Hornstein, Federalism,
Judicial Power and the "Arising Under" Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts: A
Hierarchial Analysis, 56 IND. L.J. 563, 564-65 (1981) (stating that state court
adjudications of federal law carry a higher risk of "error"); Philip B. Kurland,
Toward a Co-Operative Judicial Federalism: The Federal Court Abstention
Doctrine, 24 F.R.D. 481, 487 (1960) ("I start with the principle that the federal
courts are the primary experts on national law just as the state courts are the
final expositors of the laws of their respective jurisdictions."); Marvell, supra
note 11, at 1333-34 (citing numerous sources for the proposition that "federal
judges have much more expertise in deciding issues involving federal law
matters than do state judges").
18. I use the terms "federal solicitude" and "state hostility" interchangeably
in this Article. While the Supreme Court often speaks euphemistically of
"federal solicitude," scholars tend to more bluntly speak of"state hostility." See,
e.g., Hornstein, supra note 17, at 564-65 (stating that federal question
jurisdiction avoids the risk of"state hostility" to federal interests).
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regarded, without some effectual power in the government to
19
restrain or correct the infractions of them.
This view was echoed in the seminal case on federal question
jurisdiction, Osborn v. Bank of the United States, where Chief
Justice Marshall fielded arguments by legal luminaries Daniel
Webster and Henry Clay. Arguing that the state law claim at issue
in the case "arose under" federal law, the two asserted that "the
constitution itself supposes that [the state courts] may not always be
worthy of confidence, where the rights and interests of the national
20
government are drawn in question." While Chief Justice Marshall
did not overtly cite this position in siding with Webster and Clay, it
is strongly believed that it figured prominently in the Court's
21
decision.
Since that time, and emboldened by the events of the Civil War
22
and Reconstruction, the belief in federal solicitude towards federal
23
24
claims has persisted in both judicial and academic writings and
19. THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 535 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke
ed., 1961).
20. Osborn v. Bank of United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 811 (1824).
21. The role of state hostility is revealed most obviously in Justice
Johnson's dissent in Osborn itself. See id. at 871-72 (Johnson, J., dissenting)
(stating that the "policy of the decision is obvious," namely to "render[] all the
protection necessary, that the general government can give to this Bank").
Years later, Justice Frankfurter made the same observation. See Textile
Workers Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 481 (1957) (Frankfurter,
J., dissenting) ("Marshall's holding [in Osborn] was undoubtedly influenced by
his fear that the bank might suffer hostile treatment in the state courts that
could not be remedied by an appeal on an isolated federal question."); see also
James E. Pfander, Article I Tribunals, Article III Courts, and the Judicial Power
of the United States, 118 HARV. L. REV. 643, 714 n.314 (2004) ("Osborn itself
grew out of a perception that federal instrumentalities may need protection
from hostile state officers and state court judges who would otherwise
adjudicate common law claims.").
22. See Marvell, supra note 11, at 1331-33.
23. Merrell Dow Pharms., 487 U.S. at 827 n.6 (Brennan, J., dissenting)
("Another reason Congress conferred original federal-question jurisdiction on
the district courts was its belief that state courts are hostile to assertions of
federal rights."); Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. 506, 517-18 (1858) (stating that
"local tribunals [adjudicating federal claims] could hardly be expected to be
always free from the local influences"). Another clue to the "sympathy" purpose
behind federal question jurisdiction is the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, enacted
just four years prior to the general federal question statute. The Supreme
Court has twice analyzed the federal jurisdictional provisions of the Ku Klux
Klan Act (which is more commonly known as 42 U.S.C. § 1983 today) and
concluded that a motivating force behind the jurisdictional grant was a mistrust
of state, as compared to federal, authorities.
A major factor motivating the expansion of federal jurisdiction
through §§ 1 and 2 of the [Ku Klux Klan Act] was the belief of the
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was recently reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in 2005. 25
III. UNIFORMITY
The belief that federal question jurisdiction maintains
uniformity in federal law is based on the supposition that, as the
number of decisionmakers increases, the variability of final
decisions will increase as well. In many respects, this supposition is
entirely logical. For instance, if one asked fifty random people on
the street to name their "personal hero," nearly fifty different
answers would likely be generated. If the same question was then
posed to 100 people, the variability of responses would almost
certainly increase, resulting in something close to 100 different
responses. Thus, in this example, as the number of decisionmakers
doubles, the variability of decisions will likely double (or nearly
double).
Were this the type of question regularly adjudicated in federal
courts, one could reasonably expect state court adjudication of
federal questions to increase the variability in federal law. Of

1871 Congress that the state authorities had been unable or unwilling
to protect the constitutional rights of individuals or to punish those
who violated these rights.
Patsy v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 505 (1982); see also Mitchum v.
Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 240-42 (1972) ("The very purpose of § 1983 was to
interpose the federal courts between the States and the people, as guardians of
the people's federal rights-to protect the people from unconstitutional action
under color of state law, 'whether that action be executive, legislative, or
judicial.'") (citing Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346 (1879)).
24. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 3, at 166 (noting the "lack of
sympathy" that federal claimants might encounter in state courts); REDISH,
supra note 11, at 83 (stating, in the context offederal question jurisdiction, that
"federal judges may often be more sympathetic to federal interests than are
many state judges"); Alleva, supra note 11, at 1495-96 (noting that federal
question jurisdiction makes us of federal courts' "sympathetic, but respectful,
national perspective"); David P. Currie, The Federal Courts and the American
Law Institute, Part I, 36 U. Cm. L. REV. 1, 2-3 (1968) ("Because of persistent
state-federal hostilities ... we do not seem to have reached the point where
Supreme Court review of state courts is always adequate to assure recognition
of federal rights."); Hornstein, supra note 1 7, at 564-65 (stating that states may
be "provincialD" with respect to federal rights); Marvell, supra note 11, at 1330
(noting that the "reason most commonly cited for both federal court jurisdiction
in article III" is that "federal judges are more likely to uphold federal law
because they are more sympathetic to federally protected rights than state
judges"); Mishkin, supra note 11, at 158 (noting that federal courts are more
likely to give a "sympathetic treatment of Supreme Court precedents" than
their "state counterparts").
25. Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng'g & Mfg. Co., 545 U.S.
308, 314 (2005).
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course, this question is not the stuff of adjudication. Nor does the
way in which respondents determine their answers resemble the
methods of legal reasoning employed by courts. As explained infra,
it is improper to automatically assume that state court adjudication
of federal questions-at their current or a moderately increased
level26-is certain to increase disuniformity in federal law because
(1) the nature of many legal questions sharply limits the variety of
permissible answers, (2) norms of state court judging impose
meaningful constraints on the variety of answers judges will select,
and (3) the precedential effect of state federal-law decisions is
relatively weak. 27 Importantly, several or all of these three factors
are likely operating at the same time, making it quite unlikely that
state court adjudication-whether at its current or an increased
level-significantly affects uniformity. Before addressing each of
these points, however, it is perhaps useful to speak more specifically
about uniformity in the legal context.
Those advocating uniformity in the law argue that "federal law
should mean the same thing regardless of the forum." 28 This,
26. To be clear, this Article does not claim that a wholesale revocation of
federal jurisdiction would not affect the current level of uniformity in federal
law. As I explain infra in this Part, state courts rely significantly on federal
courts for guidance on federal questions. Thus, if federal courts were to
disappear, state courts, initially at least, would be left without valuable
guidance on federal law. While it is plausible that, after the initial shock
caused by the alteration in jurisdiction, state courts would come to rely on each
other for leadership, such a hypothesis ventures far beyond the empirical
evidence adduced in this Article.
27. To my knowledge, no scholar has studied the uniformity of federal law
as it relates to federal question jurisdiction in any depth. One commentator has
expressed doubt about the uniformity claims, which is consistent with some of
the data presented herein. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION §
5.2.1, at 263 (3d ed. 1999) ("It is not clear that ninety-four federal judicial
districts will produce more uniformity than fifty state judiciaries. It might be
argued that thirteen federal courts of appeals will produce more uniformity
than fifty state judiciaries. But this conclusion is less obvious than it might
seem. On a controversial issue, there are likely to be two or three different
positions adopted among the thirteen federal courts of appeals. Even if all fifty
state judiciaries consider the issue, there still are likely to be just two or three
different positions taken on a given legal question.").
28. Donald L. Beschle, Uniformity in Constitutional Interpretation and the
Background Right to Effective Democratic Governance, 63 IND. L.J. 539, 539
Importantly, this conception of uniformity is distinct from the
(1988).
conception of uniformity that speaks to predictability. Take, for example, the
Federal Circuit's recent patent law jurisprudence.
Commentators have
repeatedly lamented the high reversal rates that have recently manifested
themselves in certain areas of patent law. See, e.g., Kimberly A. Moore,
Markman Eight Years Later: Is Claim Construction More Predictable?, 9 LEWIS
& CLARK L. REV. 231, 233 (2005) (reviewing empirical studies of reversal rates
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however, begs an essential question if one is to evaluate legal
uniformity in a world of courts and stare decisis: how is one to define
the "meaning'' of federal law? On one level, this is quite simple.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, for example, applies only to
employers with "fifteen or more employees."29 If some courts held
employers with less than fifteen employees liable under Title VII,
while others only applied the law to employers with fifteen or more
employees, it could be said that federal law had two different
"meanings." Contrast this provision of Title VII, however, with
another of its provisions, this one making it unlawful for an
employer to "discriminate against any [employee] . . . because of
such [employee's] ... sex."30 As interpreted by the Supreme Court,
this provision prohibits employers from subjecting employees to a
"hostile work environment" based on their sex. 31 Suppose one court
found a workplace "hostile" under Title VII and another court found
a separate workplace not hostile. Would this indicate that "hostile"
had two different meanings?
Of course not. These two examples track the distinction
between pure questions law and mixed questions of law and fact.
Pure questions of law-like the employee numerosity requirementare directly tied to variability in law; in fact, under the principle of
stare decisis, answers to pure legal questions are the law. Mixed
questions of law and fact, however, are different. Such questions
are those in which "the historical facts are admitted or established,
the rule of law is undisputed, and the issue is whether the facts
satisfy the [relevant] statutory standard, or, to put it another way,
whether the rule of law as applied to the established facts is or is
32
not violated."
Under this view, because the "rule of law is
undisputed," mixed questions do not produce new "law."
More realistically, however, one must recognize that mixed
questions of law, at some level, do make law. If one court finds a
workplace where sexually suggestive pictures of women were
publicly posted to be "hostile," while another court finds the posting
and proffering new data demonstrating a 34.5% reversal rate in claim
construction cases adjudicated by the Federal Circuit). While such a high
reversal rate indicates some unpredictability in that area of law-an
unpredictability apparently stemming from ambiguous doctrine and capricious
reasoning by certain judges, it does not speak to disuniformity among separate
courts. Put another way, the data suggest disuniformity within a single court
over a period of time rather than between multiple courts at any one point in
time. This Article addresses the latter conception of uniformity.
29. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2000).
30. Id. § 2000e-2(a)(l).
31. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 780 (1998).
32. Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 289 n.19 (1982).
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of such pictures does not create a hostile work environment,
"hostile" could be said to have two different meanings. But this
example is unrealistic. Few cases turn on a single fact and even
when they do, such facts are rarely so generic as to be transferable
to other cases (thereby serving as precedent). In a hostile work
environment case, for example, a court will likely base its decision
on much more than the posting of a sexually suggestive picture, and
even if it did not, other factors (such as the employee's frequency of
exposure) would likely be relevant.
On the other hand, judicial resolution of mixed questions of law
are often preceded by statements of the applicable law. Thus, before
deciding whether a particular workplace is "hostile," courts often
explain in somewhat general terms what "hostile" means. If
different courts explained the meaning differently, "hostile" could
again be said to have multiple meanings.
In theory, such
explanations of the law are mere dicta compared to the holdingwhich is the court's actual decision and has precedential effect. In
practice, however, judicial explanations of the law-whether
classified as holding or dicta-are relied upon by subsequent courts
and have effect on the meaning of the law.
Where does this leave us in the study of uniformity? Ideally, a
study of state court adjudication of federal law would ascertain the
extent to which state courts "made" law-either through deciding
pure questions of law or explaining law prior to deciding mixed
questions. This is easier said than done, however. Classifying even
one question as either a pure question of law or a mixed question is
33
And to classify the many
a notoriously difficult endeavor.
hundreds necessary for a complete empirical study might be next to
impossible. Similarly, tracing the impact of hundreds of separate
state court decisions over time would be highly burdensome, if not
impossible. Thus, in presenting evidence on the resolution of federal
questions in state and federal courts, this Article does not
distinguish between pure and mixed questions of law. This is
unlikely to affect the results presented herein, however, because the
evidence marshaled on the uniformity issue does not hinge on the
type of question presented. Rather, the Article studies the nature

33. One court struggling with such issues has referred to mixed questions
as "elusive abominations." S&E Contractors, Inc. v. United States, 433 F.2d
1373, 1378 (Ct. Cl. 1970), rev'd, 406 U.S. 1 (1972). For an explanation of the
complexity in this area, see Evan Tsen Lee, Principled Decision Making and the
Proper Role of Federal Appellate Courts: The Mixed Questions Confiict, 64 S.
CAL. L. REV. 235, 235-36 (1991). For an argument that there is no such
distinction at all, see Ronald J. Allen & Michael S. Pardo, The Myth of the LawFact Distinction, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 1769, 1800-06 (2003).
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and methods of adjudication-all of which will apply with equal
force regardless of whether the federal question is pure or mixed.
With that, this section now turns to evidence that calls into doubt
the uniformity rationale.

The Nature of Legal Questions
As suggested at the outset of this section, questions of law differ
dramatically from other categories of questions. The difference lies
in the range of available answers imposed by the question. The hero
question posed above-which might be called "open-ended"imposes virtually no constraints on the range of answers. If the
respondent were instead asked to name his currently living personal
hero, the range of answers would be slightly more constrained and
the question would thus be somewhat more "close-ended." On the
continuum between open- and close-ended questions, legal questions
lie quite close to the close-ended pole.
For example, consider the following typical federal question:
When a school designs an individualized education plan for a
student pursuant to the Americans with Disability Education Act
("ADEA''), and the student contends that the plan is insufficient,
which party-the student or school-bears the burden of proving (or
disproving) the plan's compliance with the ADEA? In deciding this
question, it is important to note that a judge will not be constrained
by the text of the statute, for the statute is silent on the issue. 34
Assume also, for the purposes of this example, that no other piece of
positive law suggests an answer to the question. Even here, where
the judge is free to simply meditate on the metaphysical nature of
"burden" or the importance of education in a democratic society, she
would still be forced to answer the question in one of two ways:
either the student or school bears the burden. 35 And for that matter,
even if a thousand separate judges from all walks of life were
A.

34. 20 u.s.c. §§ 1400-1482 (2000).
35. This point is an important one, for it discounts the objections that
would likely be advanced by adherents to the Legal Realist and Critical Legal
Studies ("CLS") movements. Under those schools of thought, text, precedent,
and other forms of positive law impose only weak constraints on judges. See
generally JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 100 (1930); DUNCAN
KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION: FIN DE SIECLE (1997).
This is
undoubtedly true in a substantial number of cases. Yet, because the binary
nature of legal questions constrains the judge in a way that she cannot avoid,
the variability of legal answers will not be significantly increased even by
judges determined to rule without regard for law. Put another way, while the
Realists and CLS proponents might be correct that judges can manipulate
positive law to reach their own conclusions, it is not always true that judges can
manipulate the menu of decisions they can reach.
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permitted to meditate on the question, the variability in responses
would be limited to the same number potentially generated by two
judges.
Naturally, the force of this argument depends on the extent to
which federal questions admit of only a few answers. While the
ADEA question described above admits of only two possible
answers, other legal questions might admit of several different
answers. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
for example, lends itself to a plethora of interpretations. It becomes
necessary, therefore, to assess the incidence of binary or multiple
interpretations of federal law. One useful way to assess this is to
analyze the cases collected in U.S. Law Week's periodic "Circuit Split
Roundup."36 In its "Roundup," U.S. Law Week lists "cases that
acknowledge and describe disagreements in the federal courts of
appeals on various questions."37 A review of the splits noted during
1998, 1999, 2002, and 2003-some 1017 cases-reveals that the
great majority of splits are binary.
Table 1: Circuit Splits
Reported in U.S. Law Week

299
265
155
207
926

Three-way
(or more)
Splits
21
20
20
30
91

91%

9%

Two-way
Splits
1998
1999
2002
2003
Total
Percentage of
Total Splits

Total
Splits
320
285
175
237
1017
100%

As illustrated in Table 1, when federal courts split on the
meaning of federal law, they almost always split into two camps.
Only nine percent of the time do federal courts split into three or

36. The use of U.S. Law Week's "Circuit Split Round-Up" in this fashion is
not new. Another commentator, Arthur Hellman (who has studied federal
circuit splits in detail for the U.S. Government) has relied on the resource in an
extended study of the subject. See Arthur D. Hellman, Never the Same River
Twice: The Empirics and Epistemology of Intercircuit Conflicts, 63 U. PrIT. L.
REV. 81, 141-43 (2001).
37. 67 U.S. LAW WEEK 2334 (Dec. 8, 1998).
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more camps. 38 These statistics suggest that there is likely an "upper
limit" on the variety of interpretations of federal law. This, of
course, does not conclusively prove that state courts will also divide
into two camps most of the time. It does, however, suggest that, in
the adjudication of federal law, a certain phenomenon is at work
that impedes high variability in the results. To be sure, it is
possible that the phenomenon has as much to do with the
decisionmaker as the type of decision presented. I address that
possibility in the following section.
Before moving on, it is useful to note here that the data in Table
1 shows a considerable level of disuniformity in the federal system
on its own. Over 1000 disagreements of federal law-which, of
course, include only the splits uncovered by U.S. Law Week-is quite
significant. 39 Moreover, one must remember that these 1000
decisions include only splits between circuits. Federal district
courts publish many times more opinions and no doubt disagree
with themselves-both within and without the same circuit-on
many issues that have not yet yielded published appellate opinions.
These observations are important because the key issue in assessing
uniformity in a world of state court adjudication is not whether
disuniformity will occur, but whether it will occur more often when
state courts decide federal questions.
Given the rate of
disagreement already extant in the federal circuits, this sets a high
bar for those supporting uniformity rationale to clear.

B.

Norms of State Court Judging
Thus far, I have suggested that state court adjudication of
federal questions is unlikely to dramatically increase variability in
federal law because the nature of legal questions will, to a certain
extent, constrain the range of available answers. This point,

38. Of course, Table 1 only addresses instances where there is a split on the
meaning of federal law. In cases where federal courts are in complete
agreement on the meaning of federal law even though the law is susceptible to
multiple (and reasonable) interpretations, state courts might still contribute to
disuniformity inasmuch as they opt for one of the reasonable interpretations not
chosen by the federal courts. As explained infra Part III.B, there are reasons to
doubt that this would occur.
39. I recognize that this claim is inherently subjective. That is, without the
opportunity to compare disuniformity as evidenced in Table 1, supra, with
disuniformity that might develop under an alternate system, it is difficult to say
with any certainty whether 1000 circuit splits over four years is indeed
"significant." Nonetheless, I bring up the matter here to remind the reader that
disuniformity is undeniably part of the federal system and that a proper
analysis of this issue should not focus on whether state adjudication of federal
law creates any disuniformity, but whether it creates more disuniformity.
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however, does not foreclose the chance that state court adjudication
of federal questions might increase variability in federal law. For
example, it is possible that federal courts, as a behavioral matter,
tend to align themselves into two camps even though the federal
question is amenable to more than two interpretations. In this case,
it is quite plausible that state courts, not being part of the federal
circuit environment, might opt for a third, fourth, or even fifth
interpretation. Additionally, it is quite possible that, on issues
where federal courts are in complete agreement, state courts might
depart from the federal view and create variability where there was
none before. 40 A study of the norms of state court judging, however,
provides reasons to doubt this inference. As explained below, (1)
state courts routinely rely on federal precedent in making their
decisions, suggesting that their decisions will often comport with
those of the federal courts, and (2) even when state courts judge in
the comparatively unconstrained field of state common law, the
variability in their results remains quite limited.
State reliance on federal precedent.
In deciding federal
questions, state courts appear to rely on federal precedent quite
often. 41 Evidence of this is presented in Table 2, infra, which

40. See, e.g., Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 577 A.2d 1239, 1244 (N.J.
1990) (rejecting the uniform view of the federal circuits on a preemption issue
and siding instead with a state supreme court decision from another state). In
an insightful paper, Professor Donald Zeigler has catalogued the "extraordinary
number of different positions" state courts take on following federal precedentincluding positions such as "slavishly follow" and "totally disregard." Donald H.
Zeigler, Gazing into the Crystal Ball: Refiections on the Standards State Judges
Should Use to Ascertain Federal Law, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1143, 1153
(1999). While Professor Zeigler's paper is a useful compendium of approaches
state courts take, it is not (nor does it purport to be) an empirical analysis of
how state courts handle federal precedent on the whole. No doubt, some state
courts (like some federal courts) often resist binding or persuasive precedent.
This study suggests, however, that such behavior is not typical in the courts.
41. One must recognize at the outset that judges do not always speak
truthfully in their opinions. As Larry Solan explained in an insightful book on
language and judicial opinion-writing, judges face a "temptation to report the
reasons behind their decisions less than fully and openly" because they must
both justify their authority and appear neutral. LAWRENCE M. SOLAN, THE
LANGUAGE OF JUDGES 2-3 (1993); see also Lauren Robel, The Practice of
Precedent: Anastasofi; Noncitation Rules, and the Meaning of Precedent in an
Interpretive Community, 35 IND. L. REV. 399, 400 (2002) ("Our cultural
conception of precedent ... includes shared understandings of the judicial role,
which includes the burdens of justification.").
Admitting incertitude or
extralegal motivations, though honest, would significantly interfere with the
satisfaction of these goals. If Solan is correct that judges write opinions so as to
justify their authority (which is almost certainly true in at least some respects),
the citation of federal precedent may be an effort to justify authority rather
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summarizes the results of a study of 190 randomly selected state
court opinions addressing federal questions. 42
Table 2: State Court Reliance on Federal
Precedent In Resolving Federal Questions

Total cases sampled
Total or almost total reliance
on federal precedent
Reliance on federal and state
precedent
Total or almost total reliance on state
precedent
No reliance on precedent

Number
190

Percentage
100

66

34.7

45

23.7

58

30.5

21

11.1

As this data shows, federal precedent plays a significant role in
state court resolution of federal questions. In fifty-eight percent of
the cases, state courts relied wholly or partially on federal
precedent. While fifty-eight percent is certainly significant, it also
means that state courts did not rely on federal precedent in nearly
forty-two percent of the opinions. While this might give rise to
concern, a closer analysis of the data partially allays this concern.
According to the analysis of the circuit splits reported in U.S.
Law Week, splits occur most often over questions of federal statutes
or regulations rather than over constitutional questions. Of the 1017
circuit splits reported in 1998, 1999, 2002, and 2003, 87.4%
pertained to federal statutes and only 12.6% involved constitutional
Thus, to better assess state reliance on federal
questions. 43
precedent, one should focus on the cases that are typically ripe for
disuniformity.

than truthfully explain one's decision. While this may be the case in some state
cases citing federal precedent, it would be erroneous to assume that all citations
offederal precedent are mere shams. Thus, while it would be imprudent to rest
the entire uniformity analysis on this point alone, it is fair to include this
among the other factors in this section.
42. These opinions were sampled from 384 opinions published by state
appellate courts of mandatory jurisdiction published during 1991 and 2001,
which themselves were selected from over 4000 state civil opinions publishing
during those same years. For a full description of how these cases were
collected, see infra, notes 67-74 and accompanying text.
43. Specifically, of the 1017 splits, 128 involved the federal constitution and
889 involved federal statutes.
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Table 3: State Court Reliance on Federal Precedent
in Resolving Statutory Federal Questions

Total statutory federal questions in
sample
Total or almost total reliance
on federal precedent
Reliance on federal and state
precedent
Total or almost total reliance
on state precedent
No reliance on precedent

Number

Percentage

61

100

33

54.1

13

21.3

8

13.1

7

11.5

As Table 3 illustrates, state courts rely more heavily on federal
precedent in resolving statutory federal questions than
constitutional federal questions. In these cases, state courts rely on
federal precedent over seventy-five percent of the time. Thus, in the
most common field where federal courts split, state courts rely on
federal precedent rather often. This, of course, does not guarantee
uniformity in these cases, but it does suggest that state courts do
not take a "freelance" approach in deciding federal questions. 44
Instead, they appear to search for and adhere to federal precedent a
significant portion of the time.
To be sure, state reliance on federal precedent may be seen as
undercutting the uniformity argument in this Article. That is, if
this Article argues that federal question jurisdiction does not
necessarily preserve uniformity in the interpretation of federal law,
then data showing that state courts use federal precedent to resolve
federal questions suggests that federal question jurisdiction indeed
helps maintain uniformity in federal law. This argument has merit,
but does not necessarily defeat the import of the point advanced
herein. My argument-that state court adjudication of federal law
will not certainly affect the uniformity of federal law-is aimed
primarily at the common doctrinal questions facing courts. For
44. It is beyond the scope of this Article to inquire into why state courts
rely on federal precedent less on civil constitutional questions, but one might
guess that they are much more familiar with the analysis of such questionsboth because federal constitutional issues arise more often than statutory
issues in state courts, see Table 11, infra, and because state constitutions often
have provisions mirroring federal constitutional provisions. For an insightful
study of state constitutional interpretation, see generally JAMES A. GARDNER,
INTERPRETING STATE CONSTITUTIONS: A JURISPRUDENCE OF FUNCTION IN A
FEDERAL SYSTEM (2005).
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example, the uniformity argument advanced herein will be relevant
to federal courts in determining whether a particular federal
question is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts, or
may be heard in either state or federal courts. 45 To be sure, my
uniformity argument is at its weakest (on the point of state reliance
on federal precedent, at least) when federal courts are called on to
determine whether state courts, rather than federal, have exclusive
jurisdiction to hear a federal claim. In such cases, state reliance on
federal precedent would be problematic because, state jurisdiction
being exclusive, there would be no federal precedent to rely on.
While I readily admit that my data on state adherence to federal
precedent would point toward disuniformity in this class of cases, I
also note that these cases are quite rare. 46
State common law decisions. Because "[t]here is no federal ...
common law," federal questions arising in state courts stem from
federal statutes or the federal constitution. 47 Functionally speaking,
the text of statutes or the constitution (as well as precedents
interpreting these texts) impose stricter constraints on an
interpreting court (whether state or federal) than pure common law
imposes on a state supreme court. Thus, in assessing the degree to
which state courts might split on interpretations of federal law, it is
instructive to look to how they split on common law questions. If,
given the wide discretion afforded to common law courts, state
courts still split in a relatively few number of ways, this would
suggest that state court interpretations of federal law would vary to
the same degree (or even to a lesser degree) than federal court
interpretations.
To assess the variability of common law between the states, I
reviewed several hornbooks on three areas of law typically
45. See Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 483-84 (1981)
(explaining that the "desirability of uniform interpretation" is a factor to be
considered in determining whether federal jurisdiction should be exclusive or
concurrent).
46. Examples of federal laws creating exclusive state court jurisdiction
include the Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1901 (2000), the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227(e)(l) (2000), and 12 U.S.C. § 1819(D)
(2000) (addressing suits against the FDIC as a receiver that involve only the
rights or obligations of depositors, creditors, and stockholders under state law).
47. Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). This, of course, is a bit
of an overstatement because, in limited circumstances, federal courts have
created federal common law to protect federal interests. See, e.g., Clearfield
Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 366-67 (1943). While state courts are
occasionally called upon to apply (or even create) federal common law, see
Anthony J. Bellia, Jr., State Courts and the Making of Federal Common Law,
153 U. PA. L. REV. 825 (2005), such instances are quite rare relative to the
instances of statutory and constitutional interpretation.
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dominated by state common law: torts, contracts, and property. 48 To
make the analysis as methodical as possible, I paged through each
book from start to finish and scanned for places where the authors
49
noted splits of authority. While I do not contend that this research
provides a complete picture of the variability of law in these areas, I
do think it provides a representative sample of the splits. The
results are presented in Table 4.
Table 4: Variability of Common Law Between
States in Torts, Contracts, and Property50
Torts - Total splits
Two-way splits
Three-way splits
Four-way splits
Five-way splits
Contracts - Total splits
Two-way splits
Three-way splits
Four-way splits
Five-way splits
Property - Total splits
Two-way splits
Three-way splits
Four-way splits
Five-way splits
Total Splits
Two-way splits
Three-way splits
Four-way splits
Five-way splits

Number

Percentage of total

51
34
8
6
3
90
69
16
4
1
67
60
6
1
0
208
163
30
11
4

100.0
66.7
15.7
11.8
5.9
100.0
76.7
17.8
4.4
1.1
100.0
89.6
9.0
1.5
0.0
100.0
78.4
14.4
5.3
1.9

48. The hornbooks used were RALPH E. BOYER ET AL., THE LAW OF PROPERTY:
AN INTRODUCTORY SURVEY (4th ed. 1991); DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS
(2000); JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON CONTRACTS (5th ed. 2003).
49. While certain areas of state common law may be more prominent than
others in terms of the number of adjudications, my goal was simply to discern
the frequency of splits between states in as methodical a fashion as possible.
Hornbooks, because they typically cover a broad spectrum of topics and aim to
summarize the law (including majority and minority views), seemed the best
choice to accomplish this task. Targeted research on specific splits between
states would always risk the chance that the splits discovered were not
representative of the whole.
50. Descriptions of the specific splits and citations to the relevant pages of
the hornbooks are on file with the author.
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As Table 4 illustrates, when state courts disagree on the content
of traditional common law subjects, only two or three different
positions typically emerge. Given the plenary discretion state
judges enjoy in common law decisionmaking, this suggests that
some type of behavioral norm is likely at work. 51 This norm is likely
to govern the state courts' decisionmaking in federal questions as
well.

C.

Precedential Power
In addition to the close-ended nature of legal questions and
state court judging norms, state court civil adjudications are
unlikely to increase the disuniformity of federal law because they
have relatively weak precedential effect. Significant disuniformity
will only flow from decisions having significant precedential power.
To be sure, inasmuch as a single decision differs from the settled
view, that decision in itself creates some-albeit quite smallamount of disuniformity. But in the federal and state systems,
where hundreds of thousands of federal questions are decided in
civil cases each year, a single errant decision by a state trial court
does little to affect the overall uniformity of federal law. On the
other hand, a single decision by a federal circuit court on the same
issue may have a significant impact on the decisions of other courts
and consequently the uniformity of law in that field. Thus, to assess
whether state court adjudications will injure the uniformity of
federal law, one must assess the impact of state decisions. In the
field of adjudication, a decision's impact on other courts can be
measured by citations. 52 If a court issues an opinion that is never
subsequently cited, it is reasonable to conclude the opinion had little
effect on the law. To be sure, judges and clerks might read the

51. It is beyond the scope of this Article to prove why state common law
rules tend to split into only two or three camps. One could easily hypothesize,
however, that the social sciences-particularly the field of behavioral
economics-has much to say about the subject.
52. Studying citations to gauge the impact of judicial opinion is not new.
See, e.g., James H. Fowler et al., Network Analysis and the Law: Measuring the
Legal Importance of Supreme Court Precedents (2006), available at http://
ssm.com/abstract=906827 (tracking citations to develop a "network" account of
an opinion's precedential import); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner,
Legal Change, Judicial Behavior, and the Diversity Jurisdiction, 9 J. LEGAL
STUD. 367, 374 (1980) (analyzing citation frequency to assess the force of
precedent because "the number of citations to a case and the rate at which the
case depreciates in citations in later opinions appear to provide reasonable
proxies for the precedential value of an appellate decision"); Michael E.
Solimine, Rethinking Exclusive Federal Jurisdiction, 52 U. PITT. L. REV. 383,
415-16 (1991).
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op1mon and apply its reasoning without citing it, but this is
uncommon, especially given the judicial desire to justify the exercise
of undemocratic authority. 53
Before presenting the citation data, however, it is important to
note two prerequisites for even a single citation: an appeal and a
published opinion. First, although trial courts obviously address
federal questions in the first instance, they rarely, if ever, publish
their opinions. Thus, trial court adjudications of federal law will, as
a practical matter, never have precedential effect. To develop into
precedent, the case must be appealed. While it is difficult to
ascertain the civil appeal rate in the state courts, it is likely no more
than 10.9%, which is the rate in the federal system. 54 Thus,
approximately nine out of ten times, a civil decision on federal law
will not even make it to a court that publishes opinions. If a case
reaches that level, however, it is still unlikely that it will develop
into precedent because state appellate courts likely publish only a
fraction of their opinions. If the publication rate is ten percent,
which is a reasonable estimate, 55 only 1 in 100 federal questions
53. See SOLAN, supra note 41, at 2-3 (explaining the judiciary's desire to
justify its authority when drafting judicial opinions).
54. Theodore Eisenberg, Appeal Rates and Outcomes in Tried and Nontried
Cases: Further Exploration of Anti-Plaintiff Appellate Outcomes, 1 J. EMPIRICAL
LEGAL STUD. 659, 663-64 tbl.1 (2004) (finding the federal civil appeal rate to be
10.9% in cases filed between 1986 and 1997). While it is plausible that federal
questions involving constitutional rights and certain statutory rights against
discrimination might be appealed at a higher rate because of the litigant's
investment in the matter, I have uncovered no empirical evidence that this is
the case.
55. While there is little data on state publication rates, I compute a rate of
6.1 % elsewhere in this Article. See infra note 76 and accompanying text. While
I have no reason to doubt this value, federal court publication rates are
commonly thought to be near twenty percent. See David Greenwald &
Frederick A. 0. Schwarz, Jr., The Censorial Judiciary, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1133, 1135 (2002) ("[A]ppellate judges specifically designate for exclusion from
the bound volumes of the Federal Reporter approximately 80% of the opinions
they write."); Boyce F. Martin, Jr., In Defense of Unpublished Opinions, 60 Omo
ST. L.J. 177, 189 (1999) (finding that nationally, 78.9% of appellate decisions
went unpublished in 1995 and 1996, and that in the Fourth Circuit that rate
was as high as 90.3%). In light of the federal rate, and for ease of explanation
in this case, a ten percent publication rate is a reasonable estimate.
It is possible, of course, that unpublished opinions could affect the decision
of state courts. "Unpublished" decisions are routinely made available on a
variety of legal databases and an appellate judge might conceivably rely on such
opinions in deciding a case. While this is possible, the judge would still be
constrained by the no-citation rules still common in many state courts. See
Stephen R. Barnett, No-Citation Rules Under Siege: A Battlefield Report and
Analysis, 5 J. APP. PRAG. & PROCESS 473, 499 (2003) (collecting no-citation rules
from all fifty states and noting that twenty-five states expressly forbid citation
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decided by state trial courts will ever ripen into precedent that could
potentially be cited.
If a case is fortunate enough to be that 1 in 100, however, the
data below suggests that there is only a small likelihood that it will
serve as meaningful precedent. Presented in Tables 5 and 6, are the
results of a study of 190 randomly selected state court opinions
resolving federal questions. 56 Table 5 contains the citation history
for 110 opinions issued in 1991 and Table 6 contains the citation
57
history for 80 opinions issued in 2001.

Table 5: State Court Citations to State FederalQuestion Opinions Issued in 1991
Citations
(x)

Opinions with
(x) citations
50
22
9

0 citations
1 citation
2 citations
3 citations
11
4 citations
4
5 citations
2
6 citations
3
7 citations
2
8 citations
1
9 citations
5
10 citations
1
Average #of citations per opinion
Standard of deviation

Percentage of
total opinions
45.5
20.0
8.2
10.0
3.6
1.8
2.7
1.8
0.9
4.5
0.9
1.67
2.44

of unpublished opm10ns and twelve permit citation of such opm10ns as
persuasive precedent). Being unable to cite the "unpublished" opinion will
constrain the judge to some degree in explicating the applicable law. To be
sure, judges can almost always find a way to say what they wish, unpublished
opinion or not, but it is fair to say that published opinions exert a stronger force
on judges' decisionmaking than unpublished opinions.
56. Citations were counted using the Westlaw database. Each of the 190
opinions was "KeyCited" to determine the number of opinions citing to the
sample opinion for its resolution of a federal question. The state court opinions
resolving federal questions that were "KeyCited" for this analysis were pulled
from a survey of state court opinions performed for this Article. The survey,
which relates most to the "experience" argument, is explained later in the
Article. See infra notes 67-74 and accompanying text.
57. These citations were counted in August 2006. I divided the citation
count into two tables because, theoretically at least, the number of citations for
1991 opinion should be higher than the number of a 2001 opinion at any single
point in time. As some scholars have noted, however, precedent "depreciates" in
value and, after a certain period of time, is no longer cited with regularity.
Landes & Posner, supra note 52, at 376-80.
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Table 6: State Court Citations to State Federal-Question
Opinions Issued in 2001
Citations
(x)

Opinions with
(x) citations
41

0 citations
1 citation
16
2 citations
10
6
3 citations
4 citations
4
5 citations
1
1
6 citations
7 citations
0
8 citations
1
0
9 citations
10 citations
0
Average # of citations per opinion
Standard of deviation

Percentage of
total opinions
51.2
20.0
12.5
7.5
5.0
1.3
1.3
0.0
1.6
0.0
0.0
1.11
1.59

Tables 5 and 6 illustrate that the federal questions resolved by
state courts do not likely have significant impact on the content of
federal law. Nearly half the opinions, for example, have yet to be
cited even once for the federal question they resolved. While some
opinions clearly have guided other courts, the percentage of opinions
with over five citations is quite small-just thirteen percent for the
1991 opinions and three percent for the 2001 opinions. 58 Moreover,
the average number of citations for both sets of opinions is well
below two, which is roughly indicative of the whole, given the low
standards of deviation. Thus, while certainly not conclusive, these
data nonetheless suggests that state court opinions resolving federal
law do not have strong precedential force and are therefore unlikely
to significantly injure uniformity.
A useful way to consider the combined impact of the above
points on uniformity is to consider the chain of events that must
occur for state court adjudications to decrease the level of uniformity
currently extant at the federal level. First, the federal question
must be amenable to a variety of different interpretations or the
federal courts must be in uniform agreement as to the meaning of
that federal question. If either of these conditions are satisfied

58. Moreover, some citations are not especially indicative of precedential
value. In some cases, opinions are cited not to support an argument, but just to
note that another court has addressed the issue. In other cases, opinions might
be cited for their arguments, but with a "but see" signal, indicating that the
opinion is not persuasive.
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(which, as shown supra, is not extremely common), the state court
must then pay little heed to federal precedent and depart from its
usual habit of choosing among views currently established in other
courts. If, in the minority of cases where this might occur, a state
court actually decides a question of federal law incorrectly, it must
then publish that opinion and have it relied upon as precedent for
disuniformity to flourish. Moreover, because trial courts very rarely
publish opinions, the matter will likely have no precedential effect
until it proceeds to the appellate level, which only occurs in a small
fraction of cases. For disuniformity to emanate from that court, of
course, it too must ignore federal precedent, depart from other
settled views, publish its opinion, and have it relied upon as
precedent. Of course, this is unlikely.
Having addressed the uniformity rationale, this Article now
turns to the experience rationale.
IV. EXPERIENCE

The belief that federal courts have greater experience in federal
law is based on the supposition that federal courts hear many more
federal questions than state courts. While federal courts obviously
hear large numbers of federal claims, one might think that state
courts also have experience based on the federal claims they hear.
Under various interpretations of § 1331 or other judge-made
doctrines, federal questions appear in state civil proceedings on a
somewhat routine basis. For instance, because state courts have
concurrent jurisdiction with the federal courts over most federal
issues, parties may choose to litigate their federal disputes in state
courts. 59 Or, where the only federal question in a case arises as a
defense, the parties are obliged to rely on state courts to resolve
their claims. 60 Similarly, if a federal question on the face of a
complaint is not "substantial," a federal court may not assert
jurisdiction under§ 1331 and the parties must litigate the matter in
state court. 61 In still other cases, even where a substantial federal
59. Taffiin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 458 (1990) ("[W]e have consistently held
that state courts have inherent authority, and are thus presumptively
competent, to adjudicate claims arising under the laws of the United States.");
Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 394 (1947) (holding that state courts must
adjudicate federal questions if they have "jurisdiction adequate and appropriate
under established local law to adjudicate" the federal question).
60. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908); see
also Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 808 (1986) ("A
defense that raises a federal question is inadequate to confer federal
jurisdiction.") (citing Mottley, 211 U.S. at 152).
61. Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng'g & Mfg. Co., 545 U.S.
308, 314 (2005) (holding that federal question jurisdiction does not obtain
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question is pleaded on the face of the complaint, a federal court may
still choose to abstain from hearing the matter, thereby relegating
the parties to state court. 62 Based on these doctrines, many scholars
have long presumed that state courts decide significant numbers of
federal questions in civil cases. 63
Despite this presumption, there is a complete dearth of data on
what federal questions state courts actually decide.
To my
knowledge, no individual or organization has ever made an effort to
catalog the number and nature of civil federal questions that state
courts routinely decide. 64 To begin to fill this gap in the scholarship,
I reviewed the published civil opinions issued by the appellate
courts of fifteen states during 1991 and 2001. 65 Although more
research must be done, it is clear from the research thus far that
state courts, in general, decide a comparatively modest number of
civil cases involving federal questions, and therefore have less
experience than federal courts. 66 However, this does not tell the
unless a federal question is "substantial" such that a "federal forum may
entertain [the question] without disturbing any congressionally approved
balance of federal and state judicial responsibilities").
62. Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S.
423, 432 (1982) (extending Younger; holding that a federal court may not
adjudicate federal issues involved in a currently pending civil enforcement
proceeding); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 40-41 (1971) (holding that a federal
court must abstain from adjudicating claims involved in a currently pending
criminal proceeding); Burford v Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943) (holding that a
federal court should permanently abstain from hearing federal claims involving
unclear law and complex state regulatory frameworks).
63. See, e.g., Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667, 673
(1950) (noting that abrogating the well-pleaded complaint rule would cause the
federal courts to be overrun with a "vast current of litigation"); Mishkin, supra
note 11, at 162 (stating that, granting federal courts ''virtually the full
constitutional range of jurisdiction over federal questions might well flood the
national courts, thereby deflecting them from their real functions").
64. To my knowledge, only three studies have addressed this issue, though
all of them were narrow in scope. Two studies focused only on federal questions
adjudicated in state supreme courts. A third study, while more comprehensive
in terms of courts, only focused on § 1983 actions. See Daniel J. Meador,
Federal Law in State Supreme Courts, 3 CONST. COMM. 347 (1986) (studying
federal questions decided in the supreme courts of seven states); National
Center for State Courts, Comparison of Federal Legal Infiuences on State
Supreme Court Decisions in 1959 and 1979 (1981) (researching federal law
adjudicated in four state supreme courts by counting citations to federal cases);
Solimine, supra note 52, at 413-19 (researching § 1983 claims decided in state
courts).
65. The states were Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho,
Kansas, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Oregon, Utah, Washington,
and Wyoming.
66. I recognize, of course, that state courts decide many questions (both
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entire story. Upon more careful inspection, state courts likely have
significant experience in certain, limited areas of federal law.
Before presenting the results of this study, it is necessary to
explain the study's methodology. First, the universe of state cases
studied were the civil opinions published in West's Pacific Reporter67
during 1991 and 2001 by courts of mandatory jurisdiction. 68 Second,
note the focus on civil cases. Because this Article explores the
purposes of federal question jurisdiction (which is obtained only in
civil cases), it makes sense to study the civil cases adjudicated in
state and federal courts. While state criminal prosecutions often
involve federal questions (typically based on the Fourth, Fifth, and
Sixth Amendments), these cases are not cognizable in federal courts.
Furthermore, there is virtually uniform agreement that such cases
should not be litigated in federal court. 69 Thus, in a federal question
jurisdiction analysis, the most appropriate universe of cases are civil

state and federal) that are not memorialized in a published opinion. This fact is
unlikely to affect the conclusions reached in this Article because the conclusions
rely on percentages rather than aggregate numbers of cases. As long as the
publication rate is roughly similar among federal question and non-federal
question cases (and there is no reason to believe it would significantly differ),
the percentages are likely to be trustworthy.
67. I chose to focus on West's Pacific Reporter because it covers the same
states as those within the Ninth and Tenth Circuits of the federal system. This
allows one to make greater use of federal court statistics, which are often
grouped by circuit.
68. In most states, courts of mandatory jurisdiction-i.e., courts that must
hear cases properly within their subject matter jurisdiction-are trial and
intermediate appellate courts. Some states, however, do not have intermediate
appellate courts and rely on their supreme courts to handle appeals. These
courts, although typically called "supreme courts," are nonetheless courts of
mandatory jurisdiction. The states in this study without intermediate appellate
courts are Montana, Nevada, and Wyoming.
69. See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 3, at 1241 (arguing that sovereign law
should be litigated in sovereign courts). Of course, scholars have debated the
Supreme Court's ruling in Younger u. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), that state
criminal defendants may not challenge ongoing state court prosecutions in
federal courts. See, e.g., Barry Friedman, A Different Dialogue: The Supreme
Court, Congress and Federal Jurisdiction, 85 Nw. U. L. REV. 1, 2 (1990) (arguing
that abstention doctrine is the product of a "dialogic process of congressional
enactment and judicial response"); Martin H. Redish, Abstention, Separation of
Powers, and the Limits of the Judicial Function, 94 YALE L.J. 71 (1984) (arguing
that judicial abstention violates separation of powers); Michael Wells, Why
Professor Redish is Wrong About Abstention, 19 GA. L. REV. 1097 (1985)
(disagreeing with Professor Redish). Yet a suit of this type would amount to a
collateral federal action that could not alternately be filed in state court. It
therefore differs greatly from the typical civil case involving a federal question
where the claimant may choose to file in either state or federal court.
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cases. 70
To determine which civil cases in the Pacific Reporter
potentially contained federal questions, I used the Westlaw
database to identify cases that contained the term "U.S.C.A."71
Anytime a state court refers to a federal statute or the federal
constitution-regardless of how the court cites the provision or even
if the court fails to cite the provision72-West inserts a citation
containing "U.S.C.A." into the "Headnote" dealing with that portion
of the opinion. After obtaining a list of cases containing the term
"U.S.C.A.," I then read the cases to determine which ones actually
involved the resolution of a federal question. This was necessary
because, in many instances, state courts cited federal law not as
part of any analysis of a federal question, but simply as background
or as part of a tangential statement. 73 While reading the cases, I
noted the federal law that the court interpreted as well as the
Headnote under which the decision appeared. Therefore, this
process yielded a list of all federal questions decided by state courts
of mandatory jurisdiction in civil cases during 1991and2001. 74 The
70. While state habeas proceedings as well as certain parole hearings are
often couched as civil actions, I excluded such cases from the state cases
surveyed because, although they are civil in nature and may involve federal
questions, they could not be filed in federal court under federal question
jurisdiction. This is so not because federal question jurisdiction excludes such
cases, but because the Court has concluded they are cognizable only under the
federal courts' habeas jurisdiction. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 4 77 (1994).
71. Additionally, during most of the 1990s, West published an index at the
beginning of each volume listing the cases reported within that volume that
cited federal law of any type. At some point, West stopped publishing this index
and the only way to discern which state cases potentially involve federal law is
to search the Westlaw database for the term "U.S.C.A."
72. For instance, if a state court deals summarily with an equal protection
claim under the federal Constitution and does not cite to the federal
Constitution, West would still insert "U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 14" into the
Headnote dealing with that portion of the case.
73. For example, many states sanction attorneys for committing criminal
acts. In issuing a disciplinary opinion dealing with an attorney who has
violated a federal wire fraud statute, for example, the state court will often cite
the federal wire fraud statute as predicate to sanctioning the attorney.
Although the state court cited federal law, it did not resolve any federal
question. See, e.g., People v. DeRose, 35 P.3d 708 (Colo. 2001).
74. In any study of this sort, an important concern is whether the sample of
cases studied is representative of the entire universe of cases. In the context of
this study, one might wonder whether the cases issued by the state and federal
courts of the Ninth and Tenth Circuits are representative of those issued across
the entire country. Given that the Ninth and Tenth Circuits encompass fifteen
states with a broad variety of different populations, economies, cultures, and
other characteristics (compare California to Kansas to Idaho to Utah to
Washington) there is little reason to conclude that the cases issued in this
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Article now turns to this data, beginning first with a general picture
of state court experience followed by a more particular description of
such experience.
A.

In General
Looking at the overall results of the study, one notices
immediately that state courts do not decide huge numbers of civil
federal questions. Among the civil opinions published by the
appellate courts of mandatory jurisdiction in the fifteen states of the
Ninth and Tenth Circuits, federal questions arose in roughly ten
percent of the civil opinions published in 1991and2001. 75

region of the country are unrepresentative of the whole.
75. I calculated the total number of published civil opinions from courts of
mandatory jurisdiction in two steps. First, I searched the Westlaw "allstates"
database for all published civil opinions during 1991 for the fifteen states
covered in the Pacific reporter. To do this, I constructed a search that would
retrieve every published opinion (1) having a "P.2d" in its citation, (2) issued
during 1991 by a lower court, (3) but that did not have any criminal law "topic
numbers" listed in any Headnotes, (4) did not have any references to a "table" or
"memorandum" opinion, and (5) did not contain the words "not reported"which often indicate an unpublished opinion. (Table or memorandum opinions
are typically opinions listing cases that have been denied or granted certiorari,
or listing cases that have otherwise received a summary disposition.) For this
example, the specific Westlaw search instructions were:
ci("p.2d") & da(aft 12/31/1990 & bef 1/1/1992) & co(low) % to(llO 197
203 349 350H) ci(table) ci(mem!) ci("not reported")
I then repeated this search using the year 2001.
Second, because the first search only focused on lower court opinions (due
to the "co(low )" search term), I then searched specific jurisdictions without
intermediate appellate courts for the same type of cases. To collect such cases
from the jurisdiction of Montana, for example, I searched the "mt-cs" database
using the following search terms:
ci("p.2d") & da(aft 12/31/1990 & bef 1/1/1992) % to(llO 197 203 349
350H) ci(table) ci(mem!) ci("not reported")
The only difference between this search and the one noted above is the absence
of "co(low)." After retrieving cases from the states without intermediate
appellate courts (which, in the Pacific Reporter, include Montana, Wyoming,
and Nevada), I added these cases to the total cases retrieved in the first search.
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Table 7: State Civil Opinions: Federal vs. Non-Federal
Questions in States of the Ninth and Tenth Circuits

Total civil opinions published by
appellate courts of mandatory
jurisdiction
Civil opinions published by
appellate courts of mandatory
jurisdiction resolving a federal
question

1991
%
Total

2001
Total
%

2290

100

1712

100

219

9.6

165

9.6

While this quantity of federal questions appears rather
insignificant, it reveals little standing alone. Instead, it must be
compared to the number of federal questions heard in federal
appellate courts. Moreover-because the goal here is to assess
experience, which is a trait of individual judges rather than courtsone must compare the federal questions resolved per appellate judge.
This comparison is presented in Table 8.

Table 8: Federal Questions Decided Per Judge
in State and Federal Appellate Courts of the
Ninth and Tenth Circuits (2001)
State
Estimated federal questions
resolved in civil cases by
appellate courts of mandatory
jurisdiction
Number of appellate judges on
court
Federal questions resolved
per appellate judge

2705

76

Federal
3010

77

243 78

6079

11.l

78.8

76. To meaningfully compare state and federal court adjudications of
federal law, it is necessary to choose a single metric-total published opinions
or total resolved cases. On the state level, the only feasible way to count the
number of state court adjudications is to use West's Pacific Reporter-which, by
definition, contains published opinions. These results are published in Table 7.
On the federal level, the only feasible way to count federal court adjudications is
to use the statistics kept by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts-which
list total resolved cases. (Theoretically, one could page through the Federal
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Reporters to count cases, but this would be an excessively onerous task and is
not feasible without a substantial research team.) In light of this divergence, I
elected to convert the state published opinions to total resolved cases by
multiplying the number of published opinions by the publication rate of 6.1 %.
I calculated this rate by dividing the number of opinions published by
intermediate appellate courts during 2001 in twelve states within West's Pacific
reporter by the number of cases disposed of by the same courts during 2001.
According to Westlaw the intermediate appellate courts in Alaska, Arizona,
California, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Kansas, New Mexico, Oregon, Utah, and
Washington published 2223 opinions during 2001. (I left the state supreme
courts of Montana, Wyoming and Nevada out of this calculation because,
although courts of mandatory jurisdiction, their publication rates are likely to
be different due to their status as supreme courts.) According to a report by the
National Center for State Courts, these same courts disposed of 36,618 cases
during 2001. Brian J. Ostrum et al., Examining the Work of State Courts, 2002:
A National Perspective from the Court Statistics Project, at 73 (2003), available
at http://www.ncsconline.org/D_research/CSP/2002_Files/2002_Full_Report. pdf.
This yields a publication rate of 6.1 %.
Notably, this number differs somewhat significantly from federal
publication rates of roughly twenty percent. See Greenwald & Schwarz, supra
note 55, at 1135; Martin, supra note 55, at 189. If the state publication rate
were actually higher than 6.1 %, the number of federal questions likely resolved
in state appellate courts would actually be significantly lower. For example, if
the rate were twenty percent instead of 6.1%, the number of federal questions
adjudicated in state courts would be only 825 rather than 2705.
77. This number was calculated by taking the number of terminations on
the merits in the Ninth and Tenth Circuits, 6419, and multiplying it by the
percentage of cases containing federal questions terminated on the merits in all
U.S. Courts, http://www.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/
federal courts of appeals.
cmsa2001.pl (last visited Mar. 1, 2007). The percentage is 48.9%. U.S. Courts,
Table B-lA, http:// www. uscourts.gov/judbus2001/appendices/b01asep01.pdf
(last visited Mar. 1, 2007). There is undoubtedly a risk that the percentage of
federal questions terminated in the Ninth and Tenth Circuits differs from that
terminated in the other circuits. The variation, however, should not be
especially large. Even if it were larger than expected, however, it would still
not overcome the central thrust of this section, which is that federal judges have
greater experience in federal law than state judges. As Table 9 reveals, the
experience flows not only from the greater number of federal questions decided
per court, but also-and quite significantly-from the number of judges sitting
on each court. In the states of the Ninth and Tenth Circuits, state trial judges
outnumber federal trial judges by nearly 1500%.
78. Ostrum et al., supra note 76, at 73.
79. Surprisingly, a reliable way to count the number of federal judges at a
specific point in time is to consult a volume of West's Federal Reporter
containing cases from that point in time. This number, which includes both
active and senior circuit judges, was calculated using volume 240 of the Federal
Reporter, Third. 240 F.3d xii, xii-xiii (2001). The number includes both active
and senior circuit court judges, but does not include the periodic participation of
visiting judges in the cases.
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Thus, according to Table 8, the average federal appellate judge
has seven times more experience with federal questions than the
average state appellate judge. Yet, appellate experience is not an
especially useful metric for comparing state and federal courts. In
both the state and federal systems, trial judges have the final say in
the great majority of cases. Thus, a truer picture of experiencethat is, one experienced by most litigants-must focus on the
experience of trial judges.
This is easier said than done, however. Because state trial
courts rarely, if ever, publish opinions, the only way to estimate the
number of federal questions adjudicated in trial courts is to use
appeal rates. Yet, while there is reliable data on federal appeal
rates, 80 there is no such data on state appeal rates. This is perhaps
due to the wide variety of specialized courts in state systems, many
of which appeal to differing intermediate appellate or supreme
courts. 81 This makes it quite difficult to arrive at any single appeal
rate for the state system. Thus, to compare trial court experience, it
is necessary to assume a variety of different state court appeal rates.
In Table 9, federal questions in state trial courts are calculated
using a conservative, moderate, and liberal appeal rate and the
federal questions per trial judge are then calculated. 82

80. See Eisenberg, supra note 54, at 663-64 (finding the federal civil appeal
rate to be 10.9% in cases filed between 1986 and 1997).
81. For example, many states have a variety of limited subject matter
courts-such as municipal courts, juvenile courts, family law courts, probate
courts, water courts, etc.-which may appeal to several different courts, which
in turn may themselves appeal to different courts. See Ostrum et al., supra
note 76, at 11 (containing charts of court structures for each state and the
District of Columbia). Federal questions may arise in any of these courts, but
are certainly more likely to appear in courts of general jurisdiction. Thus, it is
difficult if not impossible to calculate a single, representative appeal rate.
82. I chose these appeal rates based on the evidence of appeal rates in both
state and federal courts. In state courts, the only available data on appeal rates
places the rate at 0.7%. James P. George, Access to Justice, Costs, and Legal
Aid, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 293, 298-99 (2006) (placing the appeal rate at 0. 7% after
excluding traffic court cases). At the federal level, appeal rates in civil cases
have repeatedly been placed near ten percent. See Eisenberg, supra note 54, at
663-64. Using these two rates as end points, I chose five percent as a mid-point
appeal rate.
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Table 9: Federal Questions Decided Per Judge
in State and Federal Trial Courts of the
Ninth and Tenth Circuits (2001)

Estimated federal
questions resolved in
trial courts
Number of judges on
trial courts
Federal questions
resolved per trial
judge

State
27,050 (at 10% appeal rate)
54,100 (at 5% appeal rate)
270,500 (at 1% appeal rate)
2865

84

9.4 (at 10% appeal rate)
18.9 (at 5% appeal rate)
94.4 (at 1% aooeal rate)

Federal
43,385

83

19385

224.8

As illustrated in Table 9, even under the most conservative
appeal rate of one percent, federal trial judges still adjudicate more
than two times the number of the civil federal questions that state
judges adjudicate. If the appeal rate is a more plausible five
percent, however, federal judicial experience exceeds that of states
judiciaries' by a factor of twelve. And if the state appeal rate turns
out to be at or near ten percent, federal experience with civil federal
questions would be nearly twenty-four times state court experience.

In Particular
The above data suggests that federal judges are indeed likely to
be more experienced in federal law than state judges. One must be
careful, however, not to ignore the law of diminishing returns with
respect to experience. That is, while federal trial judges might hear
twice the number of civil federal questions as state trial judges
(assuming the conservative appeal rate of one percent), state trial

B.

83. This number was calculated using a 10.9% appeal rate. See Eisenberg,
supra note 54, at 664 tbl. l.
84. See Ostrum et al., supra note 76, at 11. In counting the judges on the
state trial courts, I counted only judges in courts of general jurisdiction. Many
state courts have courts of limited jurisdiction (such as small claims, family or
probate courts) in which federal questions might conceivably appear.
Nonetheless, significant numbers of federal questions are unlikely to appear in
these types of cases and, to compare state court and federal experience in the
most conservative manner I excluded these from the total. If these judges were
added to the total state judge count, state inexperience with federal law would
be even more pronounced.
85. These judges were counted by referring to the list of judges published in
2001 in volume 142 of the Federal Supplement, Second. 142 F. Supp. 2d xii, viixxiv (2001).
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judges might still develop significant experience in federal law from
those adjudications. After all, adjudicating ninety-four cases each
year is likely to have an. educational effect on state judges. The
difficulty with this hypothesis, however, is that there are tens of
thousands of different federal laws (whether enacted as a
constitutional provision, statute, regulation, or some other form).
State trial judges might indeed gain significant experience in a
federal law if they addressed the same provision ninety-four times
each year, but they might gain very little experience if they
adjudicate a particular federal question no more than once every
couple of years. The only way to properly assess state trial judge
experience, therefore, is to consider the incidence of particular
federal questions adjudicated in state courts. As Table 10 makes
clear, the majority of federal questions resolved in state civil
opinions are constitutional questions.
Table 10: State Civil Opinions Resolving Federal Questions
Published by States of Ninth and Tenth Circuits:
Statutory v. Constitutional Questions
1991
Total
%
Civil opinions resolving federal
question(s)
Civil opinions resolving only
statutory federal question(s)
Civil opinions resolving only
constitutional federal
question(s)
Civil opinions resolving
statutory and constitutional
federal questions

2001
%
Total

219

100

165

100

60

27.4

42

25.5

142

64.8

105

63.6

17

7.8

18

10.9

This suggests that state court experience-whatever its specific
degree-is concentrated in constitutional rather than statutory
law. 86 Yet a fuller picture of state court experience with federal
constitutional law can be had by looking at the specific

86. These results are generally consistent with a small study of federal
questions taken up in state supreme courts. See Meador, supra note 64. In that
study, Professor Meador surveyed the civil and criminal opinions of seven state
supreme courts in 1983 and found that well over ninety percent of the federal
questions decided involved questions of constitutional rather than statutory
law. Id. at 351.
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constitutional questions it adjudicates in civil cases, which are
presented in Table 11.

Table 11: Constitutional Federal Questions Resolved in
State Civil Opinions Published by States of the
Ninth and Tenth Circuits87

2001

1991
Total civil constitutional
questions
Bill of Attainder
Confrontation Clause
Contracts Clause
Dormant Commerce Clause
Double Jeopardy
Eighth Amendment
Equal Protection
Ex Post Facto Clause
First Amendment
Fourth Amendment
Full Faith and Credit
Incrimination Clause
Indian Commerce Clause
Interstate Compact Clause
Presentment Clause
Procedural Due Process
Seventh Amendment
Sixth Amendment
Substantive Due Process
Supremacy Clause
Takings
Void for Vagueness

Total

%

Total

%

172

100

148

100

1
0
2
2
1
0
17
2
17
6
3
0
1
0
1
84
5
3
5
10
10
2

0.6
0.0
1.2
1.2
0.6
0.0
9.9
1.2
9.9
3.5
1.7
0.0
0.6
0.0
0.6
48.8
2.9
1.7
2.9
5.8
5.8
1.2

1
1
0
2
2
2
20
2
15
2
1
3
0
1
0
65
0
0
5
14
6
6

0.7
0.7
0.0
1.4
1.4
1.4
13.5
1.4
10.1
1.4
0.7
2.0
0.0
0.7
0.0
43.9
0.0
0.0
3.4
9.5
4.1
4.1

87. Note that this table presents the number of constitutional federal
questions, while Tables 7 and 8 presented the number of federal question
opinions. Because many cases contained more than one constitutional question,
the total constitutional federal questions in this Table differ from the total
opinions containing constitutional federal questions.
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Looking at Table 11, one sees that roughly seventy-five to eighty
percent of the constitutional questions adjudicated in civil cases are
confined to just five types of questions: equal protection claims, first
amendment claims, procedural due process claims, supremacy
claims, and takings claims. While the courts hear few civil cases in
other areas, one must be careful not to conclude that they therefore
have little experience in those areas. Due to state courts' criminal
and habeas dockets, they have significant experience-perhaps
experience even superior to federal courts-with claims under the
Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments. State courts also
likely have additional experience in due process, equal protection,
first amendment, and takings claims because many states have
constitutional provisions on these subjects that mirror (or at least
are interpreted as mirroring) the federal constitutional provisions.ss
Thus, the picture that emerges with respect to state courts'
experience in the area of constitutional law is this: state courts
likely have fairly significant experience with federal questions
predicated on the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, but
have much less experience with questions predicated on the main
body of the constitution or certain amendments (such as the Ninth,
Tenth, and Eleventh Amendments). Or, to put it a bit differently,
state courts likely have significant experience adjudicating certain
categories of individual rights claims, but very little experience
adjudicating questions of federalism and constitutional structure.
To be sure, this generalization does not hold true in all specific
instances,s9 but on the whole, it is more correct than not.
A much different picture, however, is painted by state court
interpretation of federal statutes.
Unlike the constitutional
questions often adjudicated in state court, statutory questions are
much more variegated. Moreover, state courts have no alternate
way to develop experience in these areas of law, as they do in
constitutional cases due to their criminal and habeas dockets and
analogous state constitutional provisions. Consider Tables 12 and
13, infra.

88. See generally GARDNER, supra note 44.
89. For instance, state courts seem to decide more Supremacy Clause
issues-which are structural issues-than substantive due process issueswhich concern individual rights.
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Table 12: Statutory Federal Questions Resolved in State
Civil Opinions Published by States of the
Ninth and Tenth Circuits (1991)
Statute
Total statutory federal questions
42 u.s.c. § 1983
Bankruptcy Act
Federal Employees Liability Act
Indian Child Welfare Act
Farm Credit Act
Fair Labor Standards Act
42 u.s.c. § 1985
42 u.s.c. § 1988
5 u.s.c. §§ 8336-38
Social Security Act
National Labor Relations Act
Consumer Credit Protection Act
42 U.S.C. § 1981
Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act
ERISA
Uniformed Serv. Fmr. Spouses Prot. Act
Labor Management Relations Act
Truth in Lending Act
Railway Labor Act
Patent Jurisdiction
Clayton Act
28 u.s.c. § 1447
30 u.s.c. § 29
Federal Land Policy Act
Mineral Lands Leasing Act
Vocational Rehabilitation Act
General Allotment Act
25 u.s.c. § 261-64
Food Stamp Act
Fed. Property & Admin. Servs. Act
Equal Credit Opportunity Act
Federal Credit Union Act

Total
83
16
15
4
4
4
3
3
3
3
2
2
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

%
100
19.3
18.1
4.8
4.8
4.8
3.6
3.6
3.6
3.6
2.4
2.4
2.4
2.4
2.4
1.2
1.2
1.2
1.2
1.2
1.2
1.2
1.2
1.2
1.2
1.2
1.2
1.2
1.2
1.2
1.2
1.2
1.2
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Table 13: Statutory Federal Questions Resolved in State
Civil Opinions Published by States of the
Ninth and Tenth Circuits (2001)
Statute

Total

Total statutory federal questions
Indian Child Welfare Act
42 u.s.c. § 1983
Bankruptcy Act
Social Security Act
Labor Management Relations Act
Healthcare Quality Improvement Act
National Labor Relations Act
ERISA
Fair Labor Standards Act
Federal Arbitration Act
42 U.S.C. § 1981
18 u.s.c. § 1151
Communications Act of 1934
Title VII
Americans with Disabilities Act
Gun Control Act
ICC Termination Act
Uniformed Serv. Fmr. Spouses Prot. Act
Rehabilitation Act
National Trails System Act
Columbia River Gorge ... Mgmt. Plan
Federal Railroad Safety Act
28 U.S.C. § 1333
Food Security Act
Immigration Reform and Control Act
Emerg. Medical Trmt. & Active Lab. Act
Communications Decency Act
Full Faith & Cred. Child Supp. Or. Act
Title VI
42 U.S.C. § 1988
10 u.s.c. § 1408

63
11
5
5
3
3
3
3
2
2
2
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

%
100
17.5
7.9
7.9
4.8
4.8
4.8
4.8
3.2
3.2
3.2
3.2
3.2
3.2
1.6
1.6
1.6
1.6
1.6
1.6
1.6
1.6
1.6
1.6
1.6
1.6
1.6
1.6
1.6
1.6
1.6
1.6

Unlike the constitutional questions heard in state courts (which
were mostly confined to five types of claims), federal statutory
questions are not concentrated in any particular area. The only
questions appearing with any regularity involve § 1983, the
Bankruptcy Act, and the Indian Child Welfare Act ("ICWA"). The
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Bankruptcy Act, and ICWA cases-which comprise about a quarter
of the statutory questions-are unimportant for the present
analysis, however. Litigants wishing to file for bankruptcy must do
90
Thus, although state courts may have
so in federal court.
experience in a particular portion of the bankruptcy code, 91 that
experience is not "available" to a claimant choosing between state
and federal court. Similarly, the ICWA regulates child custody
disputes involving Native Americans that are filed in state courts. 92
Thus, this question-though federal in nature-is in practice an
insufficient predicate for federal question jurisdiction.
With these cases put aside, one sees that state court experience
with federal statutes is highly limited. State courts hear only a
scattering of claims based on federal legislation.
While
approximately thirty different statutes appeared in state opinions in
1991 and 2001 respectively, the number of adjudications per statute
was little more than token. Roughly seventy-five percent of the
statutes were adjudicated only one or two times in over fifteen
states. And only one statute (42 U.S.C. § 1983) was ever addressed
more than ten times during both 1991 and 1992. 93 Thus, state court
experience with federal legislation appears to be highly limited.
In sum, while state courts likely have significant experience
adjudicating certain types of federal individual rights claims, they
have little experience on the whole with federal law. This lack of
experience is particularly extreme in the field of federal statutes.
The Article now turns to the question of whether federal courts will
likely be more solicitous of federal claims than state courts.
V.

SOLICITUDE

Another belief that animates federal question jurisdiction is the
belief that federal courts are likely to be more "solicit[ous]" of federal

90. Federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over bankruptcy proceedings.
28 U.S.C. § 1334(a) (2000).
91. State cases involving the Bankruptcy Act typically involve questions of
whether state judgments assessing fines against a bankruptcy petition violate
the Act's automatic stay on all subsequent actions against the debtor. See, e.g.,
Miller v. Nat'l Franchise Servs., 807 P.2d 1139 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991)
(considering whether automatic stay entered by federal bankruptcy court
pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362 prohibits garnishment of debtor's salary).
92. See 25 U.S.C. § 19ll(a) (2000).
93. While the Bankruptcy Act and Indian Child Welfare Act were each
adjudicated more than ten times on one occasion, as noted above, such statutes
are relatively unhelpful in assessing state court experience. See supra notes 9092 and accompanying text.
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94

claims than state courts. Put differently, this belief contends that
federal courts somehow care more than state courts about federal
claims, or conversely, that state courts care less about federal
claims. 95 This section inquires into whether this belief is justified.
Looking to the research and scholarship in this area, one sees that,
in some instances, there are reasons to believe that federal courts do
care more about federal claims. In other instances, however, such
reasons are absent. Given this state of affairs, an answer to the
solicitude question necessarily rests on how well the two bodies of
evidence can be aggregated and weighed against each other. As
explained below, it is unlikely that, given the current state of
knowledge in this field, this task will be attainable. It follows that
the presumption of federal solicitude is not justified as a purpose of
federal question jurisdiction. This is not to say that research into
solicitude (or parity more generally) has not been productive or
should not continue. Such research has tremendous value to a
broad variety of questions facing judges, legislators, and court
administrators. My point here is simply that, given the current
state of knowledge on this subject, it is impossible at this point to
justify a system-wide presumption that federal courts are preferable
to state courts for plaintiffs advancing federal claims.

94. Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng'g & Mfg. Co., 545 U.S.
308, 312 (2005).
95. While it is tempting to conclude that "solicitude" is simply an alternate
expression for the supposed lack of parity between state and federal courts, this
conclusion would be much too facile. As is well known in the federal courts
field, the parity debate is chiefly animated by three issues: technical
competence, psychological set, and susceptibility to majoritarian pressures.
Given that this conception of the debate includes the issue "technical
competence," it is clear that any reference to federal "solicitude" should not be
understood to generally refer to the alleged lack of parity between the state and
federal courts. As explained supra Part II, the common beliefs justifying federal
question jurisdiction include uniformity, solicitude, and expertise. If solicitude
referred to parity in general, it would render the expertise factor irrelevant.
While this may seem like an overly literal reading of recent Supreme Court
precedent, the view aligns closely with history. At the outset of the republic,
Hamilton defended federal jurisdiction as a necessary protection from state
hostility. Of course, as there was no such thing as an Article III judge when
Hamilton spoke, and no such thing as general federal question jurisdiction until
1875, it is practically impossible to read expertise into the historical defenses of
federal question jurisdiction. Indeed, it was not until the mid-twentieth century
that commentators came to agree that "federal courts have acquired a
considerable expertness in the interpretation and application of federal law, ...
most noticeabl[y] with regard to what are called 'federal specialties,'" such as
"bankruptcy and federal antitrust litigation." AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra
note 3, at 164-65.
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The argument in favor of federal solicitude is built chiefly on
two institutional characteristics of the federal courts. 96 First, federal
judges, as compared to state judges, are "insulated from
majoritarian pressures" and second, federal judges possess a
"psychological set" making them more likely than state judges to
97
uphold federal claims. Each of these points is discussed separately
below.

A.

Majoritarian Pressures

Federal judges are thought to be more solicitous of federal
claims in part because they, as a practical matter, have life tenure.
State judges, in contrast, are often subject to election. 98 From this
observation flows the inference that federal judges are more
insulated from "majoritarian pressures" and are therefore freer to
rule in favor of political minorities (who are often advancing
constitutional claims). 99 Were this a complete and accurate picture
of federal and state judicial institutions, as well as the behavior of
the electorate, this inference might be justified.
It is not such a picture, however. To begin with, the claim that
state judges are beholden to majoritarian pressures "rests, in part,
on the assumptions that judicial elections are based on evaluations
of how judges decide cases; that state court judges recognize this (or
fear it) and are influenced in their decisionmaking by future
electoral review; and that federal judges are not affected by the
same public sentiments." 100 This has not been proven, however, and

96. Many prominent scholars base their belief in federal "solicitude" on
these arguments. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND
REFORM 172 (1985) (stating that "systematically different conditions of
employment" between state and federal judges permit one to infer that federal
courts are preferable to state courts in advancing civil rights claims); Burt
Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1122-27 (1977); Martin
H. Redish, Judicial Parity, Litigant Choice, and Democratic Theory: A Comment
on Federal Jurisdiction and Constitutional Rights, 36 UCLA L. REV. 329, 333
(1988) (noting that an "inescapable logical inference" makes federal courts
preferable to state courts with respect to civil rights claims).
97. Neuborne, supra note 96, at 1120, 1127.
98. Id. at 1127-28. This observation was truer at the time Professor
Neuborne made it than it is today. See Michael E. Solimine, The Future of
Parity, 46 WM. & MARYL. REV. 1457, 1491-94 (2005) (noting electoral reforms in
state judiciaries).
99. For a summary of state judicial selection methods, see Mark A. Behrens
& Cary Silverman, The Case for Adopting Appointive Judicial Selection Systems
for State Court Judges, 11 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'y 273, 314-60 (2002).
100. Erwin Chemerinsky, Federal Courts, State Courts, and the
Constitution: A Rejoinder to Professor Redish, 36 UCLA L. REV. 369, 372 (1988).
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has even been disproven in at least one instance. 101 Yet, even if it
were, the inference would only hold true for the thirty-nine states
that actually use elections to choose judges. 102 Moreover, even
within those thirty-nine states, it is not likely to hold true to the
same degree. Some states elect their supreme court judges but
appoint lower court judges, while other states elect all of their
judges. 103 Sometimes, the method of choosing judges differs even
within a single court. In the Kansas trial courts, for example, the
governor appoints some judges while the electorate chooses others. 104
Not only do states differ in their use of elections, but they differ
considerably in their election methods. For example, some states
hold partisan elections while others hold nonpartisan elections and
still others hold retention elections after initial appointments. 105
In light of this picture of state judicial selection methods, one
must doubt whether a single inference can be safely drawn about
majoritarian pressures on state judges. While one might be able to
infer pressure or lack of pressure for a particular state, it is difficult,
if not impossible, to aggregate the huge number of inferences-some
of which are at odds with empirical evidence-necessary to adopt a
single federal position on the matter. Thus, a system-wide belief
that federal courts are, on the whole, more solicitous of federal
claims is unmerited on this point.

101. For example, in a study of federal constitutional claims related to gay
rights, Daniel Pinello found that state elected judges sided with gay rights
claimants more often than appointed judges, and that all state judges, on
average, sided with the gay rights claimant more that federal judges. See
DANIEL R. PINELLO, GAY RIGHTS AND AMERICAN LAW 110-17 (2003). For another
empirical study involving gay rights, see William B. Rubenstein, The Myth of
Superiority, 16 CONST. COMM. 599, 599-600 (1999) (concluding that states may
be as or more hospitable to gay rights than federal courts).
One notable study suggesting electoral pressures are important is Paul
R. Brace & Melinda Gann Hall, The Interplay of Preferences, Case Facts,
Context, and Rules in the Politics of Judicial Choice, 59 J. POL. 1206 (1997). In
this project, the authors studied death penalty decisions and concluded that
"selection procedures systematically influence, in the long term, the overall
predispositions of those who occupy the bench." Id. at 1207. While this an
important data point, it is insufficient to justify a system-wide belief in state
majoritarian pressures. Death penalty cases are often highly publicized and
important to the public, and thus differ from the great majority of federal
claims heard in state and federal courts.
102. Behrens & Silverman, supra note 99, at 314-60 (collecting judicial
selection methods for each state and the District of Columbia).
103. Id.
104. Id. at 329.
105. For a complete summary of state judicial selection methods, see id. at
314-60.
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Psychological Set
The second institutional characteristic allegedly demonstrating
federal solicitude is the federal courts' "psychological set" favoring
the enforcement of constitutional rights. 106 This psychological set
allegedly flows from federal judges' (1) recognition that they are
"heirs of a tradition of constitutional enforcement,'' (2) greater
kinship with the Supreme Court and its mission, and (3) "ivory
tower" mentality that allows them to recognize the primacy of rights
without the pressure and emotions attending many state trials. 107
As with the "majoritarian pressure" claim, were this "psychological
set" claim based on an accurate picture of federal judges (and by
implication, state judges), then one might be justified in believing
that the entire federal judiciary, on the whole, would have greater
solicitude for federal claims than state courts. Yet, as with the
"majoritarian pressure" claim, this claim also proves too strong for
the tenuous state of the evidence on this subject.
To be sure, some federal judges undoubtedly possess such a
psychological set. There is little evidence, however, that the
psychological set extends across the majority of the federal bench
and applies to the majority of federal claims. Yet, even if the
mindset was pervasive and consistent throughout the federal courts,
it is not clear that such a set necessarily favors federal claims in
comparison to state court adjudication. In fact, there is at least
some evidence suggesting the contrary. For example, in a study of
eighty-six federal and 307 state court decisions on gay rights claims,
Daniel Pinello concluded that when "adjudicating federal
constitutional issues . . . state tribunals resolved lesbian and gay
rights claims 56.3% more positively than federal courts." 108 Another
scholar who has studied litigation of gay rights in state and federal
court has opined that state court solicitude for such rights may stem
from the state courts' own psychological set, one developed among
judges "who more regularly interact professionally with gay
people." 109 Whether one buys these claims or not, these studies
nonetheless suggest the psychological set of judges-even if it could
be generalized into a single "set" applicable to the majority of
judges-likely applies to different cases in different ways.
For example, what psychological set would a plaintiff advancing
claims under the Takings Clause prefer? Such claims typically pit
the rights of an individual against the needs of a community. As
putative "heirs of a tradition of constitutional enforcement,'' federal
106. Neuborne, supra note 96, at 1124.
107. Id. at 1124-27.
108. PINELLO, supra note 101, at 110.
109. Rubenstein, supra note 101, at 615.
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judges certainly recognize that the Constitution enshrines both the
tradition of individual rights (by requiring, inter alia, "due process of
law" and "just compensation") and community needs (by providing
for, inter alia, eminent domain). no It is not clear that federal judges,
even if "heirs of a tradition of constitutional enforcement"-a
tradition from which state courts are presumably excluded-would
rule more often in one way or another. In fact, this is what one
scholar found in a study of Takings Clause cases adjudicated in
state and federal courts. 111 In his view, the judicial analyses in state
and federal courts "are startling in their similarity" and cast doubt
on the assumptions that federal courts will decide cases differently,
on takings claims at least. n2
Of course, gay rights and Takings Clause claims are just two of
many hundreds, if not thousands, of possible federal claims. It is
quite possible that a federal psychological set makes a difference in
other types of cases. Yet these examples were not meant to question
the substantive claim that a psychological set exists (certainly some
type of common psychological set exists among federal judges, even
if quite thin), but rather to question the notion that a single
psychological set predicts, on average, federal solicitude for federal
claims. There are simply too many claims and too many contexts
surrounding each claim to conclude that, on the whole, federal
claimants will benefit from a psychological set present on the federal
bench. To reiterate, I do not argue that such a set does not exist;
rather, I only argue that the kaleidoscopic variety of claims and
interests arising under federal law make it exceedingly difficult-if
not impossible-to generalize as to the solicitude of federal courts
for all federal claims.
Thus, as a distinguished empirical scholar in the field recently
admitted, "none of the empirical literature on parity is, or purports
to be, even remotely definitive."na Without such definitiveness, it is
improper to presume that federal solicitude is at work in federal
adjudication and therefore a valid purpose of federal question
jurisdiction. This Article now turns to a purpose of the jurisdictional
grant rarely recognized by scholars in this field: the protection of
certain federal sovereignty interests.

110. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
111. Brett Christopher Gerry, Parity Revisited: An Empirical Comparison of
State and Lower Federal Court Interpretations of Nollan v. California Coastal
Commission, 23 HARV. J.L. & PuB. POL'y 233 (1999).
112. Id. at 285.
113. See Solimine, supra note 98, at 1469.
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VI. SOVEREIGNTY

Under the classic conceptions of sovereignty, a sovereign has
the implicit authority to determine the rules of the territory over
which it is sovereign. 114 If the sovereign chooses a system of
government that relies on judicial interpretation of that sovereign's
law, the sovereign has a keen interest in (1) having the opportunity
to craft its own law through adjudication and (2) appearing as a
party before its own courts rather than the courts of some other
sovereign.
AB explained below, statutory federal question
jurisdiction serves the first, but not the second, sovereignty
interest. 115
Lawmaking Interests. Under the United States Constitution,
Congress has the primary authority to make law. Because the
judiciary adheres to a principle of stare decisis, however, judicial
interpretation of federal law-whether by state or federal courtshas the effect of law. The federal government, therefore, has a
strong interest in having the opportunity to adjudicate questions of
Without this opportunity, state courts would
federal law.
essentially control the meaning of federal law. 116
114. The classic conceptions of sovereignty stem from the writings of
Thomas Hobbes and John Locke. See Helen Stacy, Relational Sovereignty, 55
STAN. L. REV. 2029, 2032-35 (2003).
115. England v. La. State Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 375 U.S. 411, 415-16 (1964)
(noting the state courts' role as the "final expositors of state law" and the
"primacy of the federal judiciary in deciding questions of federal law");
Chemerinsky & Kramer, supra note 3, at 80-81 (noting the role of federal courts
in serving sovereignty interests); Friedman, supra note 3, at 1242 ("A
sovereign's interest in ... defining the laws and rules that govern [its] society,
seeing that those laws and rules are obeyed, and punishing those who
transgress them . . . is a quintessential aspect of sovereignty."); Martin H.
Redish, Reassessing the Allocation of Judicial Business Between State and
Federal Courts: Federal Jurisdiction and "The Martian Chronicles," 78 VA. L.
REV. 1769, 1774 (1992) (stating that "it makes practical sense for a sovereign's
courts to have primary responsibility for adjudication of that sovereign's law").
116. While the federal government would still maintain the ability to review
state court decisions through the U.S. Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction,
see 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (2000), it would be virtually impossible for the Supreme
Court to meaningfully superintend the meaning of federal law on its own. For
discussions of the Supreme Court's modern docket and monitoring abilities, see
Margaret Meriwether Cordray & Richard Cordray, The Supreme Court's
Plenary Docket, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 737, 743 (2001) (noting the Court's
decrease in docket size from about 150 cases prior to the 1980s to between
seventy-six and ninety-two currently) and Edward A. Hartnett, Questioning
Certiorari: Some Reflections Seventy-Five Years After the Judges' Bill, 100
COLUM. L. REV. 1643, 1704-13 (2000) (noting the plenary discretion afforded to
the Supreme Court to decline appellate jurisdiction). While Professor Solimine
recently observed that "available evidence seems to indicate that the Supreme
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Using § 1331, litigants file approximately 140,000 federal
question cases each year. 117 Of course, only a portion of these yield
judicial opinions by district or appellate courts that become positive
law, 118 but without this jurisdictional grant, the federal courts would
have only limited opportunities to rule on federal questions. 119 Thus,
§ 1331 is the main avenue through which the federal government
can control the content of its own laws. This is far from shocking, of
course, but it is repeatedly ignored in assessing the purposes of
federal question jurisdiction. 120
Litigant Interests. A different situation is presented, however,
with the federal government's interest as a party to litigation.
Under this type of sovereignty interest, the federal government has
an interest in suing and being sued in its own courts. While this is a
preeminent interest of a sovereign, the question here is whether
statutory federal question jurisdiction serves this interest.
The answer is no. Several statutes other than§ 1331 grant the
federal courts jurisdiction over cases where the federal government
is a litigant. For instance § 1345 grants "district courts ... original
jurisdiction of all civil actions, suits or proceedings commenced by
the United States, or by any agency or officer thereof authorized to
sue by Act of Congress." 121 Similarly, both § 1346 and § 1441(b)
guarantee the federal government, its agencies and officers access to
Court has been able, to a tolerable degree, to carry out the monitoring function
[of state courts]," such evidence says little about the Supreme Court's ability to
monitor state courts in a world without statutory federal question jurisdiction.
See Michael E. Solimine, Supreme Court Monitoring of State Courts in the
Twenty-first Century, 35 IND. L. REV. 335, 359 (2002).
117. Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, Table 4.8: U.S. District Courts, Civil
Cases Filed by Jurisdiction, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judicialfacts
figures/Table408.pdf (listing number of cases filed under § 1331 for past six
years, which ranged from 138,441 to 165,241).
118. According to a study of over 1600 state and federal cases, only twenty
percent remained in the judicial system long enough to be resolved on the
merits either by pretrial motion or a trial on the merits. Herbert M. Kritzer,
Adjudication to Settlement: Shading in the Gray, 70 JUDICATURE 161, 163
(1986).
119. Federal courts also have jurisdiction over civil cases where the U.S.
government is a party. These cases, however, are much less numerous
(approximately 55,000) and are typically limited to specific areas of law. See
Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, Table 4.8: U.S. District Courts, Civil Cases
Filed by Jurisdiction, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judicialfactsfigures/
Table408.pdf (listing number of cases filed in federal court in which U.S.
government was a party). Moreover, many cases-such as those involving the
Federal Tort Claims Act-require federal courts to apply state law. See 28
u.s.c. § 2674 (2000).
120. See supra note 3.
121. 28 u.s.c. § 1345 (2000).
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a federal forum if sued. 122 Beyond jurisdiction in the district courts,
litigant interests are broadly protected by the Court of Federal
Claims, which, generally speaking, has jurisdiction over non-tort
suits for money damages against the United States government. 123
In addition to these jurisdictional provisions, numerous other
statutes guarantee the federal government access to a federal
forum. 124 Thus, while the federal government clearly has an interest
in suing or being sued in a federal forum, many statutes other than
§ 1331 accomplish this goal.
Still, one could argue that such statutes are duplicative of
§ 1331 and that § 1331 alone could serve this interest. After all,
many federal statutes, such as the Civil Rights Act and RICO
statute, contain jurisdictional provisions that are duplicative of §
1331. 125 Moreover, the Supreme Court has clearly held that a case
"arises under" federal law for the purposes of Article III if the
126
federal government is a party to the action.
This ignores,
however, that the Court has interpreted § 133l's "arising under"
clause much more narrowly than the Article III clause. 127 Under this
122. Id. §§ 1346, 1441(b).
123. Id. § 1491.
124. See, e.g., id. § 1347 (granting district courts jurisdiction over a partition
action where the United States is a joint tenant); id. § 1348 (granting district
courts jurisdiction over cases involving corporations organized under an Act of
Congress where the United States owns more than half the corporation's capital
stock); id. § 1355 (granting district courts jurisdiction to enforce "any fine,
penalty, or forfeiture, pecuniary or otherwise, incurred under any Act of
Congress"); id. § 1357 (granting district courts jurisdiction for "injury to person
or property on account of any act done by him, under any Act of Congress, for
the protection or collection of revenues, or to enforce the right of citizens of the
United States to vote in any state"); id. § 1358 (granting district courts
jurisdiction over "all proceedings to condemn real estate for the use of the
United States or its departments or agencies"); id. § 1361 (granting district
courts jurisdiction over "any action in the nature of a mandamus to compel an
officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof to perform a duty
owed to the plaintiff''); id. § 1444 (permitting the United States to remove a
state court foreclosure action to federal court).
125. See supra note 7 (noting redundant jurisdictional statutes).
126. See Osborn v. Bank of United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 811
(1824).
127. Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 494-95 (1983)
("Although the language of § 1331 parallels that of the 'arising Under' [sic]
clause of Art III, this Court never has held that statutory 'arising under'
jurisdiction is identical to Art III 'arising under' jurisdiction."). See generally
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 27, at § 5.2 at 266-67 (addressing the distinction
between jurisdiction under Article III and under § 1331). For excellent
historical accounts of the statutory grant of jurisdiction, see James H.
Chadbourne & A. Leo Levin, Original Jurisdiction of Federal Questions, 90 U.
PA. L. REV. 639 (1942) and Ray Forrester, The Nature of a "Federal Question,"
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narrower understanding, a case whose federal nature stems only
from the United States' status as a party would not fall within the
128
"arising under" jurisdiction of § 1331.
Thus, if statutory federal
question jurisdiction were abolished, the federal government's
litigant interests would not be harmed at all.
As explained above in the preceding Parts, federal question
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 serves two particular purposes.
It provides litigants with access to judges likely to be experienced in
federal law (particularly in statutory form) and it allows the federal
government to control the meaning of federal law. With these two
purposes presented, the Article now turns to another purpose that
might be attributed to the jurisdictional grant but is nonetheless not
proven by empirical evidence.

VII. CASELOAD
It is tempting to think that, in addition to the purposes
explained above, federal question jurisdiction also shoulders a large
caseload burden.
Without federal question jurisdiction, the
argument goes, state courts would be besieged by an avalanche of
federal claims. When one looks more closely at the data, however,
this claim is not borne out.
In 2003, 142,591 cases were filed in federal court pursuant to
129
federal question jurisdiction.
In that same year, litigants filed
100.1 million cases in state courts. 130 If federal question jurisdiction
were abolished and the state courts had to absorb 142,591 federal
question cases, the caseload of the state courts would increase only a
tiny 0.14%. Yet, it is likely improper to use the states' total
caseload, since it undoubtedly includes many small cases such as
traffic court cases and small claims court cases, which require
significantly fewer judicial resources to adjudicate. To better assess
the marginal burden that federal question cases would impose, one

16 TUL. L. REV. 362, 374-77 (1942).
128. One exception to this would be in the field of government contracts. In
resolving contract disputes in which the U.S. government is a party, courts
typically apply federal common law, which is a sufficient hook for federal
question jurisdiction under§ 1331. See, e.g., Almond v. Capital Props., Inc., 212
F.3d 20 (1st Cir. 2000); Montana v. Abbot Labs., 266 F. Supp. 2d 250 (D. Mass.
2003).
129. See Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Federal Judicial Caseload
Statistics, Table C-2 (Mar. 31, 2005), http://www.uscourts.gov/caseload2005/
contents.html.
130. Richard Y. Schauffier et al., Examining the Work of State Courts, 2004:
A National Perspective from the Court Statistics Project, at 14 (2005), available
at http://www.ncsconline.org/d_research/CSP/2004_Files/EW2004_Main_Page.
html.
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must consider the specific types of cases adjudicated in state courts.
These are listed in Table 14.

Table 14: Total Incoming Cases in
131
State Courts in 2003 (in millions)
Case Type
Traffic
Criminal
Civil
Domestic
Juvenile
Total

Unified & General
Jurisdiction
14.0
6.2
7.6
4.1
1.4
33.3

Limited
Jurisdiction
40.6
14.4
9.4
1.6
0.8
66.8

Looking at Table 14, one immediately sees that limited
jurisdiction cases account for the great majority of state cases.
While these are not always small in size (a divorce case in a limited
jurisdiction family court, for example, may require significant court
resources to resolve), it is likely that most cases in these courts are
small. Similarly, some cases in the courts of general or unified
jurisdiction-such as traffic cases-do not individually impose large
burdens on the state courts. A better picture of state caseloads (for
the purposes of this Article, at least) would include all non-traffic
cases in courts of unified or general jurisdiction-which number 19.3
million. Using that value, an addition of 142,591 federal question
cases would only increase state caseloads by a negligible 0.7%.
Certainly, if faced with the task of absorbing the federal courts'
federal question docket, state judges and court administrators would
claim that state courts do not have the capacity to absorb even a
0. 7% increase in caseload. This may well be correct, but it does not
mean that federal question jurisdiction therefore shoulders a huge
caseload burden. It might suggest, however, that federal question
jurisdiction therefore provides federal claimants with a forum that
will review their claims more quickly than alternative fora. While
there is certainly something to this (federal courts do tend to dispose
of cases more quickly than state courts), the difference in case
processing time is not so substantial that it rises to the level of a
specific purpose accomplished by federal question jurisdiction. 132
131. Id.
132. According to the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, federal
district courts disposed of civil cases, on average, in 8.4 months from time of
filing. See Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, Federal Judicial Caseload
Statistics, Time Intervals From Filing to Disposition of Civil Cases Terminated,
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Moreover, even if one recognized this as a limited purpose of the
jurisdictional grant, it would not be useful in deciding jurisdictional
questions. While different cases will implicate experience and
control interests to different degrees, all cases will implicate the
expediency issue to the same degree. That is, regardless of the
subject matter of a case or the federal law involved, federal courts
assessing their jurisdiction will always be justified in assuming that
federal adjudication will proceed somewhat more quickly than state
courts in adjudicating the claim. Thus, the expediency factorthough perhaps enlightening in general-does little to help courts
actually determine the contours of federal jurisdiction.

VIII. EXPERIENCE AND CONTROL IN PRACTICE
Replacing the "uniformity-solicitude-experience" regime with an
"experience-control" regime has important implications for many
federal question doctrines, particularly those that are explicitly
based on the traditional purposes. 133 While the chief purpose of this
Article has been simply to adduce the empirical evidence on the
jurisdictional grant rather than explore its doctrinal implications, a
short exploration of one area of law will illustrate the potential
import of this evidence. Thus, this Article briefly discusses the
doctrines of concurrent jurisdiction, exclusive federal jurisdiction,
by District and Method of Disposition, at 54, Table C-5 (2004), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/caseload2004/tables/C05Mar04. pdf.
According to a
study of thirty-nine urban trial courts across the country, state courts disposed
of civil cases, on average, in 417 days--or 13.9 months-from the time of filing.
See John A. Goerdt et al., Reexamining the Pace of Litigation in 39 Urban Trial
Courts, at 39, Table 3.2 (1991), http://www.ncsconline.org/WC/Publications/
KIS_ CasManReexamPaceLitig. pdf.
133. Other than concurrent and exclusive jurisdiction, which are discussed
in this part, the shift in purposes identified in this Article will certainly be
relevant to three particular subjects in federal jurisdiction: the well-pleaded
complaint rule, federal jurisdiction under counterclaims, and substantial
federal question jurisdiction. Each of these subjects has been debated in terms
of the traditional purposes of federal question jurisdiction and the new purposes
identified in this Article offer a new perspective on the debate. See Doernberg,
supra note 11 (claiming that the well-pleaded complaint rule contradicts the
traditional purposes of the federal question jurisdiction); John F. Preis,
Jurisdiction and Discretion in Hybrid Law Cases, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 145 (2006)
(using the traditional purposes of federal question jurisdiction to assess the
appropriate jurisdictional rule to govern substantial federal question cases);
Larry D. Thompson, Jr., Adrift On a Sea of Uncertainty: Preserving Uniformity
in Patent Law Post-Vornado Through Deference to the Federal Circuit, 92 GEO
L.J. 523 (2004) (arguing that the Supreme Court decision Holmes Group, Inc. v.
Vornado Air Circulation Systems, Inc., 535 U.S. 826 (2002), which held that
counterclaims containing a federal question cannot provide a basis for federal
question jurisdiction, will injure the uniformity of patent law).
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and exclusive state jurisdiction.
Under the Supreme Court's view, "nothing in the concept of our
federal system prevents state courts from enforcing rights created
by federal law." 134 Thus, there is a "deeply rooted presumption in
favor of concurrent state court jurisdiction."135 This presumption,
however, has been criticized as contradicting the traditional
purposes of federal question jurisdiction. That is, a presumption of
concurrent jurisdiction causes numerous meaningful federal
questions to end up in state court, where they will injure the
uniformity of federal law. 136 In light of the evidence presented in
this Article, however, the criticisms are misplaced and the doctrine
is entirely justified. State court adjudications of federal law have
little effect on its uniformity because legal questions are extremely
close-ended, state courts typically follow narrow paths which tend to
adhere to federal precedent, and state opinions that depart from
settled views are highly unlikely to have significant precedential
effect. Thus, contrary to views of many, concurrent jurisdiction is
entirely unproblematic in the field of federal jurisdiction.
Of course, although federal jurisdiction is presumed to be
concurrent with the states, exclusive federal jurisdiction is
warranted if the presumption is rebutted. Under Supreme Court
precedent, one may rebut the presumption by showing "an explicit
statutory directive, by unmistakable implication from legislative
history, or by a clear incompatibility between state-court jurisdiction
and federal interests." 137 The first two grounds for rebutting the
presumption in favor of concurrent jurisdiction are tied to
Congress's prerogative to make federal jurisdiction exclusive while
the third is tied to the judiciary's prerogative. 138 Regardless of who
134. Charles Dowd Box Co., Inc. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 507-08 (1962).
135. Taffiin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 459 (1990).
136. See Chemerinsky & Kramer, supra note 3, at 84. Other concerns, such
as with state hostility or experience in federal law, are not implicated by
concurrent jurisdiction because, if the case contains a substantial federal
question, either party may choose to have the case heard in federal court. The
plaintiff may file the case there in the first instance or the defendant may
remove it there. 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (2000).
137. Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 478 (1981).
138. Of course, it is eminently debatable whether the judiciary has any
prerogative at all in this respect. Moreover, in a case decided soon after
Taffiin-Yellow Freight Sys., Inc. v. Donnelly, 498 U.S. 820 (1990)-the
Supreme Court did not claim authority to craft exclusive jurisdiction doctrine
on its own. Instead, it stated the exclusive jurisdiction turns solely on whether
Congress "affirmatively divest(s] state courts of their presumptively concurrent
jurisdiction." Id. at 823. Nonetheless, Gulf Offshore and Taffiin, which both
claim judicial authority to craft jurisdiction under the "clear incompatibility"
approach, are the more commonly cited and accepted authorities on the subject.
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decides whether federal jurisdiction over a particular subject matter
should be exclusive, however, the ultimate inquiry appears the
same. Exclusive jurisdiction is warranted by "the desirability of
uniform interpretation [of federal law], the expertise of federal
judges in federal law, and the assumed greater hospitality of federal
139
courts to peculiarly federal claims." In light of the principles upon
which exclusive federal question jurisdiction has thus far been
based, as well as the new principles identified in this Article, the
question becomes: which grants of exclusive jurisdiction are justified
and which areas of concurrent jurisdiction deserve exclusive
jurisdictional status?
Currently, several types of legal questions are heard only within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts: admiralty, 140 patent
143
141
142
and copyright, bankruptcy, antitrust, and federally regulated
145
144
securities, among others.
Viewed in light of the purposes of
federal experience and the desire to control the content of federal
law, as well as the reality that concurrent jurisdiction supplemented
146
by the right of removal (rather than exclusive state jurisdiction) is
the alternative, one sees that exclusive jurisdiction is never
warranted. While federal courts no doubt have superior experience
in these areas (especially because exclusive jurisdiction has divested
139. Taffiin, 493 U.S. at 464 (citing Gulf Offshore Co., 453 U.S. at 483-84).
While the quoted factors are from the Supreme Court's understanding of the
"clear incompatibility'' inquiry, the policy decision undertaken by Congress
admits of the same considerations. See Redish, supra note 116, at 1811 (noting
that "[t]he most striking aspect of [the reasons advanced in favor of exclusive
federal jurisdiction] is their similarity to the justifications generally given for
the provision of general federal question jurisdiction in the first place").
140. 28 u.s.c. § 1333 (2000).
141. Id. § 1338(a).
142. Id. § 1334.
143. See, e.g., Miller v. Granados, 529 F.2d 393, 395 (5th Cir. 1976)
(concluding that federal courts should have exclusive jurisdiction over antitrust
suits brought under the Sherman and Clayton Acts); Washington v. Am. League
of Profl Baseball Clubs, 460 F.2d 654, 658 (9th Cir. 1972) (same); Cream Top
Creamery v. Dean Milk Co., Inc., 383 F.2d 358, 363 (6th Cir. 1967) (same).
144. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (2000).
145. Other less prominent areas of exclusive federal jurisdiction include
maritime prize cases, 28 U.S.C. § 1333(2) (2000); suits against consuls or viceconsuls, id. § 1351; suits for recovery or enforcement of civil fines, penalties or
forfeitures under federal statutes, id. § 1355; suits seeking review of certain
customs decisions, id. § 1581; quiet title actions against the United States, id. §
2409(a); suits under the Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. § 717u (2000); suits under
the Miller Act, 40 U.S.C.S. § 3133(b)(3) (LEXIS through Sept. 2006
amendments); and, state suits for violations of the Commodity Exchange Act, 7
U.S.C. § 13a-2(2) (2000).
146. 28 u.s.c. § 1441 (2000).
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the states of any experience), concurrent jurisdiction allows either
party to bring the suit before an experienced federal tribunal. With
respect to the federal government's interest in controlling the
content of federal law, the evidence reveals that, while litigants may
seek state court review of scores of different federal statutes, in
practice they rarely do. Thus, opening up the state courts to
subjects traditionally within the realm of exclusive federal
jurisdiction is likely to have little effect on federal ability to control
the meaning of federal law.
Unlike concurrent or exclusive federal jurisdiction, exclusive
state jurisdiction over federal law completely divests litigants of any
opportunity to invoke any experience of a federal judge as well as
divests the lower federal courts of any opportunity to control the
content of federal law .147 Without concurrent jurisdiction, removal is
impossible and thus will not preserve litigant interests in these
circumstances. Yet on the whole, exclusive state jurisdiction is not
troublesome. First, given that federal questions within the state
courts' exclusive jurisdiction were placed there by Congress (rather
than the judiciary), it is doubtful that the federal courts have any
superior experience to bring to the matter. Moreover, some federal
statutes in the state courts' exclusive jurisdiction concern subject
matters over which they have traditionally exercised jurisdiction. 148
Second, although exclusive state jurisdiction divests the lower
federal courts of control over federal law, it does not divest the
Supreme Court of its appellate jurisdiction over state final
judgments involving federal law. 149 While, as noted supra, the
Supreme Court's ability to superintend state supreme court
decisions is highly limited, 150 this ability is not so lame that it cannot
address the relatively few federal laws within the state courts'
exclusive jurisdiction. Were Congress to place more subject matters
within this category of jurisdiction, however, federal control over
federal law might suffer in significant ways. Were that to occur,
federal question jurisdiction would be advisable.
IX. CONCLUSION

It is customary to conclude articles of this sort with a summary
of the conclusions presented within it. As I trust such conclusions

147. For examples of federal statutes that may only be enforced in state
courts, see supra note 46.
148. See Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1901 (2000) (granting state
courts exclusive jurisdiction over child custody matters involving Native
American children).
149. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (2000).
150. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
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have been sufficiently explained throughout, I instead close this
Article with a short observation on the continuing need for empirical
studies on the federal and state courts. It is somewhat amazing
that, in an age when legal research has been hugely simplified by
computers, so much doctrine in the realm of federal jurisdiction still
rests on untested (albeit sometimes logical) suppositions. Time and
again, the top scholars in this field have recognized that "[a] central
task of the law of federal jurisdiction is allocating cases between
151
state and federal courts."
Yet to this day, there is surprisingly
little evidence on what our allocation doctrines actually
accomplish-that is, what types of cases actually appear in state
and federal courts. This Article has attempted to make a small dent
in this paucity of scholarship. To be sure, however, much more
needs to be done. While those in academia are well-equipped at
studying data, they are less able to gather data. Therefore, progress
in this area will occur only with contributions by other institutions,
such as the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts and the
National Center for State Courts.
These institutions have
contributed mightily thus far but have not always focused on data
th~t have doctrinal relevance. A new focus on this area as well as
increased effort by many academics will contribute much to the field
in the coming years.

151. Friedman, supra note 3, at 1216.
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